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Juvenile Code'
BY KATHLEEN D. PATTERSON*
INTRODUCTION

In 1978, the Kentucky General Assembly identified the need
for statutory reform in two areas of juvenile law: the care and

treatment of dependent, abused and neglected children and the
treatment of juveniles who commit serious offenses. In response
to the latter, both houses of the General Assembly passed "gettough" legislation concerning juvenile offenders.2 Governor
Julian Carroll later vetoed this legislation.3 Two task forces were
formed, however: the Governor's Task Force on Juvenile Delinquency4 and the Task Force on Child Abuse and Neglect.5 These
groups jointly recommended enactment of a unified juvenile
code. As a result, the legislature passed the Kentucky Unified Juvenile Code (referred to in this article as the 1980 Code) on the
last day of the 1980 legislative session, but delayed its implementation until July 1, 1982.6 The legislature also passed Senate Resolution 55,7 mandating review and recommendations for revision
of the 1980 Code. The proposed Kentucky Uniform Juvenile
Code (referred to in this article as the proposed Code), the subject of this article, is the result of the extensive revisions performed by the Senate Resolution 55 Task Force, which finished
its work in August of 1981.
J.D. 1982., University of Kentucky.
1980-81 SPECIAL TASK FORCE TO STUDY THE COMMONWEALTHS JU-

1 REPORT OF THE

VENILE CODE (1981). At this writing the proposed Code has obtained neither the status of
a committee report nor that of a bill. Since it is unpublished, citations to the proposed
Code shall be styled in this work "ch. X, § Y." A copy of the proposed Code is on file with
the Kentucky Law Journal.In addition, since the repeal of the present juvenile provisions
found in KY. REV. STAT. ANN.chs. 199 through 208 (Bobbs-Merrill 1977 & Cum. Supp.
1980) [hereinafter cited as KRS], has been delayed, citations to these provisions will not reflect the original date of repeal, July 1, 1982. See note 8 infra and the accompanying text
for an explanation of the status of the current provisions.
2 Ky. S.143, Reg. Sess., SENATE JOURNAL 1890, HOUSE JOURNAL 2461 (1978).
3 Id. (vetoed Mar. 30,1978).
4 See Exec. Order No. 78-535 of Governor Julian M. Carroll (1978).

5 See Ky. H.R. Res. 130, Beg. Sess., HOUSE JOURNAL 2129 (1978).
6 Act of Apr. 9,1980, ch. 280, §§ 1-147,1980 Ky. Acts 848, 848-918.
7 Ky. S.J. Res. 55 Reg. Sess., SENATE JOURNAL 669 (19 0).
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The 1980 Code would repeal the existing juvenile statutes
found in Kentucky Revised Statutes (KRS) chapter 208 and in
many sections of chapter 199. It would supersede, but not repeal,
those sections of chapter 202A (the mental health commitment
provisions) which deal with minors. In order to enact the proposed Code, the legislature must repeal the 1980 Code. Because
of general budgetary constraints, the 1982 session of the Kentucky General Assembly did not repeal the 1980 Code and enact
the proprosed Code; instead, the General Assembly delayed implementation of the 1980 Code until 1984, when the necessary
funds may be available. 8 Even though the proposed Code will
not be enacted soon, the legislature recognizes the need for the
proposed Code and remains committed to enacting it as soon as
funds permit. Therefore, the legal community should be aware
of the reforms which enactment of the proposed Code would
bring about. This article will examine the work of the drafters of
the proposed Code, focusing on the legislative goals that
prompted the drafting of the proposed Code.
The proposed Code is lengthy: ten distinct chapters are set
forth. Chapter 600 provides an extensive list of definitions applicable to the entire Code; chapter 605 sets forth the responsibilities of the district court and extensively details procedures generally applicable to the entire Code. Chapter 615 includes the interstate compact on juveniles and the interstate compact on the
placement of children, required because of Kentucky's participation in those agreements. Chapter 620 addresses substantive
rights, procedures and dispositions applicable to children who
are abused, neglected or dependent. Termination of parental
rights is the subject of chapter 625. Chapter 630 deals with the
8 Ky. S. 282, Reg. Sess. (enacted Mar. 31, 1982), summarizedin KENTUCKY LEGISLATIVE RESEARCH COMM'N, GENERAL ASSEMBLY ACTION: REGULAR SESSION 1982, at 18 (In-

formational Bulletin No. 143, 1982). This action by the Kentucky General Assembly delays the repeal of the statutory provisions which are now in effect (KRS chs. 199-208 (1977
& Cun. Supp. 1980)). Thus, the present provisions will remain in force until at least July,
1984; it is planned that the proposed Code (referred to in this article as chapters 600-645)
will be introduced during the 1984 session of the General Assembly as a revision of the not
yet effective Kentucky Unified Juvenile Code appearing in KRS chapters 208A-208G
(Cur. Supp. 1980). It is pertinent to note, however, that KRS chapters 208A-208G, now
scheduled to go into effect on July 1, 1984, will be repealed and will never become effec-

tive if the proposed Code becomes law.
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status offender and chapter 635 with the public offender. The
problems of the "serious" juvenile offender, which helped to
prompt the development of the proposed Code, are addressed by
chapter 640, which designates such minors as youthful offenders.
Finally, chapter 645 addresses the commitment of mentally disordered children.
It is beyond the scope of this article to address each of the
above chapters in comprehensive fashion. This article will focus
primarily on the latter six chapters, with references to and explanations of the general provisions of the proposed Code where relevant. It is the purpose of this article to provide an analytical
overview of the proposed Code, a comparison with other codes or
statements of juvenile justice policy where appropriate, and a
critique where necessary.
I.

ABUSED, NEGLECTED OR DEPENDENT CHILDREN9

The preamble to chapter 620 of the proposed Code states:
It must... be understood that children have certain fundamental rights which also must be protected and preserved.
These rights include, but are not limited to the rights to adequate food, clothing and shelter; the right to be free from
physical, sexual or emotional injury or exploitation, the right
to develop physically, mentally, and emotionally to their potential, and the right to educational instruction and the right
to a secure, stable family. It is further recognized that upon
some occasions, in order to protect and preserve the rights and
9 General provisions concerning abused, neglected and dependent children can be
found in chapter 620 of the proposed Code. Most state statutes, including Kentucky's,
make separate reference to "dependency," "abuse" and "neglect." While it is difficult to
generalize, it may be said that in dependency cases parents are unable to care for a child
through no fault of their own. Accordingly, "dependent child" would be defined in the
proposed Code to mean "any child who is under improper care, custody, control or guardianship that is not due to an intentional act of the parent." Ch. 600, § 2(14). Neglect and
abuse determinations, on the other hand, usually involve a finding of parental fault;
"abuse" usually refers to willful injuries to the child, while "neglect" means inadquate pa-

rental care. See Wald, State Intervention on Behalf of Neglected Children: Standardsfor
Removal of Children From Their Homes, Monitoring the Status of Children in Foster
Care, and Termination of ParentalRights.28 STAN. L. REy. 623, 625 n.2 (1976). The pro-

posed Code, however, would make no distinction between the latter two and would define both in the same terms. See ch. 600, § 2(1).
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needs of children, it is necessary to remove a child from his or
her parents. 0
The creation of chapter 620 to deal exclusively with
abused, neglected or dependent children would reflect a
legislative determination that such children should not be
legally categorized with children who have committed
status offenses or volitional criminal acts which bring

them within the jurisdiction of the juvenile court. The
policy statement of the chapter would reflect a necessarily ambivalent reaction to the tragedy of a child harmed
in his own home. Public outrage, puzzlement and a variety of motivations lead the state to intervene in family situations in which a parent harms his child or fails to protect the child from harm, yet such action must be balanced against the fundamental notions of family autonomy and a parent's traditional right to the care, custody
and control of his children free from state interference.1
To this end, chapter 620 would clarify the grounds on
which intervention may be made and, to some degree,
would shift the emphasis from the primacy of children's
'0Ch. 620, § 61(1). Such "preamble statements" indicative of legislative intent are
rare, but they are also found in the chapters of the proposed Code dealing with termination of parental rights and the treatment of children with mental disorders.
11
Intervention may'inot be based solely on the state's interest in protecting the child.
Rather it must be based, in part, on the state's other interests in the child. For example,
the state has an interest in disrupting the cycle of abused or neglected children becoming
abusive or neglectful parents. For a discussion of the etiology of child abuse, see THE BATTERED CHILD (R. Heifer & C. Kempe eds. 1968); Grumet, The PlaintivePlaintiffs: Victims of the Battered Child Syndrome, 4 FAM. L.Q. 296 (1970).
12 See Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645 (1972); Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158
(1944). See also Bourne & Newberger, "Family Autonomy" or "Coercive Intervention"?
Ambiguity and Conflict in the Proposed Standardsfor Child Abuse and Neglect, 57
B.U.L. REv. 670 (1977). The legal basis for these fundamental parental rights has received
considerable analysis but remains unclear. One line of thought suggests that parental
rights derive from property rights in the child, i.e., the "child as chattel" approach. See
Fritts v. Krugh, 92 N.W.2d 604 (Mich. 1958). Others have contended that the parent has
inherent natural rights in the child which the constitution protects. See Pierce v. Society of
Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923). A third theory proposes that parental rights derive from a trust reposed in them by the state acting as parens
patriae. See In re Jacques, 138 A.2d 581 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div1958). See also Cordon,
Terminal Placements of Children and Permanent Termination of ParentalRights: The
New York PermanentNeglect Statute, 46 ST. Jourfs L. REv. 215,215 n.1 (1971).
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rights to the rights of parents or other persons exercising
custodial care or supervision of the child.13
Regardless of the perceived efficacy of state intervention in matters of abuse and neglect, it is axiomatic
that no intervention is possible if the children and families in need cannot be identified. Unwillingness to report
suspected abuse may be a result of many factors: failure
to recognize abuse, disbelief that a parent could harm his
child or fear of legal entanglement. 14 To overcome such
barriers, mandatory reporting provisions have been enacted in every state.'5 The reporting provision of the proposed Code would be expansive, requiring that "[a]ny
person who knows or has reasonablecause to believe that
a child is an abused or neglected child.

cause a report

to be made."' 6

. .

immediately

The provision would impose

an objective standard on the duty to report,'17 and would

differ significantly from the prior reporting provision
only in its requirement that professionals who encounter
child abuse or neglect in the course of their duties also file
a written report within forty-eight hours of the original
report.' 8 The identity of persons reporting abuse would
13 This shift in emphasis is illustrated by new provisions which would mandate legal
representation for all parties in temporary removal hearings and adjudications of neglect
or abuse, and which would also mandate that all parties receive timely notice and an opportunity to be heard. The provisions of this chapter would generally be extended to a new
party: "[A]ny person who may have assumed the role and responsibility of parent or guardian for the child, but who does not necessarily have legal custody of the child." Ch. 600,
S 2(30).
14 See, e.g., McCoid, The Battered Child and OtherAssaults Upon the Family:Part
One, 50 MINN. L. REv. 1, 36 (1965); Paulsen, Child Abuse Reporting Laws: The Shape of
the Legislation, 67 COLUM. L. REv. 1, 4 (1967).
15 See Sussman, Reporting Child Abuse: A Review of the Literature, 8 FAM. L.Q.
245, 272 (1974), for a discussion of the scope of various mandatory reporting laws.
16 Ch. 620, § 62(1) (emphasis added). The report could be made by any means, including telephone, to the police or to the Department for Human Resources or its representative. Ch. 620, § 62(1).
17 The objective standard provides greater protection for the child than the subjective standard under which a person suspecting abuse, but not reporting it, can shield his
own poor judgment by standing behind his opinions. See Sussman, supra note 15, at 278.
18 Ch. 620, § 62(2). Compare ch. 620, § 62(2) with KRS § 199.335 (Gum. Supp.
1980) (where the filing of a written report is at the discretion of the agency receiving the
report).
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be confidential, and anyone acting with reasonable cause
in making a report would be immune from any civil or
criminal liability.19
Upon receipt of a report, and after the requisite follow-up investigation, the proposed statute contemplates that three situations may be presented: (1) the child is found in "imminent danger," necessitating emergency temporary custody;20 (2) the report
of abuse is unfounded and no action is necessary; or (3) no "imminent" danger to the child is presented, but there is evidence of
abuse or neglect sufficient to compel the filing of a complaint. 2'
Authorizing the temporary protective removal of a child from his
home is perceived by many as a necessary evil and a method susceptible to misuse.2 This charge may have some basis, especially
with regard to the emergency temporary custody provision, since
"imminent danger" is not defined by the statute and the very nature of the action taken-immediate, drastic and irreparablewould make judicial review-' an ineffective remedy. Without
more express statutory guidance, actions taken under the provi19Ch. 620, § 64(1) & (4). Although necessary, the provision that the husband-wife
privilege is no defense to failure to report may have the effect of inhibiting reporting. See
Ch. 620, § 64(2). The identical provision of KRS § 199.335(7) (Cum. Supp. 1980) has
been construed to abrogate the privilege in any judicial proceeding resulting from a report
pursuant to the chapter-including criminal proceedings. See Commonwealth v. Boarman, 610 S.W.2d 922 (Ky. Ct. App. 1980). The intent to reach that result would be made
explicit in the proposed provision.
2 See ch. 620, § 63(3)(a)-(c). These provisions would authorize temporary emergency removal, without a court order, by a law enforcement officer or physician (although in the case of a physician, only if the child were hospitalized or in the immediate
care of the physician). Id. An attempt would have to be made to obtain a court order
within three hours or at the "earliest practicable time." Ch. 620, § 63(3) (b). A complaint
would be filed upon the granting of the emergency custody order. Ch. 620, § 66(1). A
child could also be taken into emergency temporary custody, pursuant to court order, if it
appeared to the court that there were reasonable grounds to believe that the child would
be abused, neglected or dependent if returned to or left in the custody of his parents. Id.
These provisions would not incorporate the concept of "imminent danger" and would allow temporary removal upon a showing of probable cause of abuse or neglect. Pre-adjudication removal in the absence of imminent danger to the child has been soundly criticized.
21 See ch. 620, § 65.
2 Sussman, supra note 15, at 291.
23 Ch. 620, § 67(4) would specifically allow parents to file a petition for immediate
entitlement in circuit court. This could quickly remedy the situation and return the child
where the intrusion was unwarranted, but the psychological and emotional damage of the
unwarranted intrusion-to parents and child-would be afait accompli.
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sion would be susceptible to the vagaries of subjective judgment
as to what constitutes "imminent danger." The flaw of this provision would be tempered, however, by the temporary removal
hearing required within seventy-two hours of taking the child
into custody. The proposed temporary removal hearing requirement would be a significant improvement on the current statutes, which provide that emergency custody of a child is allowed
(1) in "imminent danger" situations, without court order (the
only requirement is that one must be sought within seventy-two
hours),2s and (2) in suspected neglect or abuse situations, upon
court order.2 Neither current provision, however, limits the
duration of such temporary custody or provides any interim
hearing. Thus, under current law, a child may be held until the
case is heard on the merits.-"
Under the proposed Code, the court would have to determine at the temporary removal hearing whether there were
grounds to believe that the child is abused or neglected and, if so
finding, the court could issue an order for temporary removal. s2
The order would have to state the specific grounds for removal
and would have to show that less restrictive alternatives to removal, such as provision of social services in the home, had been
considered.2

2 See ch. 620, § 66(3). The emergency custody order would dissolve after 72 hours
unless there had been judicial review with oral notice to the county attorney, parent or
some other person exercising custodial control over the child. Id.
2 KRS § 199.335(4) (Cum. Supp. 1980).
2 KRS § 208.080(2) (1977).
27 Seeid.
28 Ch. 620, § 67(2). The court would have to find that the state had met its burden
of proof by a preponderance of the evidence. One commentator has suggested that because
of the difference in the seriousness of various types of harm, the level of proof required on
the removal issue should differ depending on the type of harm involved. He suggests that
the need for removal should be shown by "clear and convincing" evidence in nonphysical
abuse cases and by a "preponderance of the evidence" in cases where the child has been
physically injured by non-accidental means. Wald, supranote 9, at 654.
29 Ch. 620, § 67(2). This requirement would be an innovative departure from the
current provision, and it would codify the "least restrictive alternative" policy of the Department for Human Resources. Accordingly, the court could, when placing a child in
temporary custody, consider the wishes of the parent and give preference to placement of
the child with available and qualified relatives. See ch. 620, § 67(3).
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If the court should determine that a formal proceeding is
necessary, it would have to inform the parent and childo of their3
right to a full adjudicatory hearing within twenty-one days, '
and appoint counsel both for the child 32 and for the parents, if
they are unable to afford counsel.3o These provisions in the proposed Code would significantly expand the due process rights
traditionally afforded the parties. The current statutes provide
only that a guardian ad litem be appointed to represent the
child's interest, and that the court appoint counsel for the parent
only if the parent requests it and if, in the opinion of the court,
justice will be served.3 Furthermore, in neglect and abuse proceedings, these rights currently seem to arise only in actions to
terminate parental rights.3 The expansion of the right to counsel
and the provision of notice at each stage of these proceedings
would be indicative of a move to formalize the juvenile court
proceeding, a purpose expressly reflected in the general provisions of the proposed Code which state that "[t]he hearings shall
be conducted in a formal manner."36
30 The parent and child would have to be informed of their respective rights under
ch. 620, § 66(4)(a) when theywere "brought before the court." This could often occurfirst
at the temporary custody hearing or, in the event there had been no pre-adjudication removal, when the parent and child were summoned before the court pursuant to a complaint. See ch. 610, § 22(1).
31 The current statute pertaining to the conduct of hearings, KRS § 208.060(1)
(Cum. Supp. 1980), requires only that "cases involving children brought before the court
shall be granted a speedy hearing." Furthermore, a temporary custody order presently
may be effective indefinitely-"until the case is heard on the merits." KRS § 208.080(2)
(Cum. Supp. 1980).
32 Ch. 610, § 24(1). In re Gault, 387 U.S.1 (1967), granted a child the right to an attorney in delinquency proceedings, on the ground that the child might well be deprived of
his liberty by the proceeding. Extending the child's right to counsel to abuse and neglect
proceedings has been urged on grounds similar to those expounded in Gault: (1) the impact of the decision on the child's life; and (2) the possible conflict between the child's
rights and interests and those of the state or parents. Grumet, supranote 11, at 314.
33 Ch. 610, § 24(1). The statutory mandate of the proposed chapter that both parent
and child be represented by counsel would be an expansion of the general statutory right
to counsel proposed elsewhere in the Code, which would require that in proceedings other
than those involving abuse and neglect, the court "shall appoint counsel for the child and
may appoint counsel for the parents." Id. (emphasis added).
34 KRS § 199.603(8) (Cum. Supp. 1980). See also Department for Human Resources
v. Nester, 585 S.W.2d 437 (Ky. Ct. App. 1979).
3 See KRS § 208.060(3)(a) (1977). Under this provision parties are advised only of
their respective rights to counsel in delinquency or status offense actions.
3 Ch. 610, § 25(2). Cf. KRS § 208.060(l) (Cum. Supp. 1980) (states that "hearings
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The full adjudicatory hearing would be, as before, a bifurcated proceeding consisting of an adjudication and a disposition.37 The dispositional alternatives in an abuse or neglect proceeding would be codified for the first time and would include,
but not be limited to: (1) informal adjustment of the case; (2)
protective orders; (3) removal of the child to the custody of an
adult relative; or (4) commitment of the child to the custody of
the Department for Human Resources for a period not to exceed
the point at which the child reaches the age of eighteen.A8 The
proposed Code additionally, "for the first time, [would confirm]
that the child and the family are entitled to receive the fullest
medical, social and educational services as a means of forestalling
removal of the child and subsequent placement in a foster
home." 19 If there were no alternatives which would adequately
protect the child from harm, then-and only then-would the
court be allowed to order removal.40
Experts in all disciplines have criticized most systems of intervention for failing adequately to monitor the needs of children in
foster care. 4' It is well documented that children in "temporary"
foster care often remain there for long periods of time and are
subjected to multiple placements. 42 The impermanence and lack
of continuity inherent in such "foster-care drift" discourage the
development of the close ties between a child and responsible
may be conducted in an informal manner").
37 Ch. 620, § 68(2) & (3). Cf. KRS S 208.060(2) (Cum. Supp. 1980) (states that
"[j]uvenile proceedings shall consist of two distinct hearings, an adjudication and a disposition").
3 Ch.620, § 70. It is significant to note that parental rights could not be terminated
upon a determination of abuse or neglect alone without a showing of other factors. See
notes 76-80 and the accompanying text infra for a discussion of termination.
39 McAnulty, A Unifled Juvenile Code; Summary of Legislative Change in 1980, in
Juvenile Practice,4 BALDwms KENTUCKY PRACTICE (Supp. 1981 p. 2) (discussing the iden-

tical languageof KRS § 208B.090(2) (Cum. Supp. 1980)). Seealso ch. 620, § 69.
40 Ch. 620, § 69. See B. BERNSTEIN, D. SNIDER & W. MEEZAN, A PRELIMINARY REPORT: FOSTER CARE NEEDS AND ALTERNATIVES TO PLACEMENT (1975).
41 See Mnookin, Child CustodyAdjudication:JudicialFunctionsin the Faceof Indeterminacy, 39 LAw & CoNTEMP. PRoBs. 226 (1975); Wald, supra note 9.
42 See Wald, supra note 9, at 645 n. 107. Relatively long-term "temporary" foster
care may be necessary in some instances. Some experts contend that a minimum of two
years of intensive treatment is required to be effective with abusing families. See, e.g., E.
SHERMAN, R. NEUMAN & A. SHYNE, CHILDREN ADRIFT IN FOSTER CARE: A STUDY OF ALTERNATIVE APPROACHES (1974).
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adults that are essential to healthy emotional growth.43 Such
problems were well recognized by the drafters of the proposed
Code, and the provisions which would be implemented to address these criticisms would include an express statement that
"services provided to the parent and the child shall be designed to
44
promote the return of the child to his home as soon as possible."
The proposed Code further would promote continuity between
45
parent and child in foster care by allowing parental visitation,
codifying the present policy of the Department for Human Resources. It would also require that the Department periodically
review the status of each child in foster care at least every six
months, and establish a specific treatment plan for the child and
family. 46 Parents would be entitled to notice of and an opportunity to attend and participate in such conferences, With counsel if
desired. 47
Thus far, we have addressed the applicable procedures, safeguards and dispositions available once it has been determined
that intervention is necessary, but the standard of interventionthe determination of when to intervene-remains to be considered.
43 "[T]here is no empirical evidence demonstrating that breaking an attachment per
se has any long-term harmful effcts ... .The evidence is stronger that multiple placements harm children. Each placement subjects a child to discontinuities that may impair
normal developmental processes... [and] may impair the child's ability to form lasting
attachments." Wald, supra note 9, at 670-71. See also J. GOLDSTEIN, A. FREUD & J. SOLNIT, BEYOND THE BEST INTERESTS OF THE CHILD (1973).
44 Ch. 620, § 71. Some commentators, such as the drafters of the IJA-ABA Juvenile
Justice Standards Project, propose determinate foster care with subsequent termination of
parental rights if the child cannot be returned home at the end of the determined time. See
STANDARDS RELATING TO ABUSE AND NEGLECT § 8.3 (Tent. Draft 1977).
4 Ch. 620, § 75(1)(c). Visitation may be helpful in various ways: (1) parental involvement may help the child cope with the trauma of separation; and (2) a program of
required visitation may force the parents to decide whether they want to retain contact
with or regain the custody of the child. See Wald, supra note 9, at 678. At least one study
has found that the amount of parental visitation is a valid predictor of whether the child
will eventually return home. See Fanshel, ParentalVisiting of Children in Foster Care:
Key to Discharge?,49 Soc. SERV. REV. 493 (1975).
4' Ch. 620, § 75(1)(a). Although the statute would mandate review, it would not

provide statutory guidelines for the return of the child to the home.
47
Id.Permitting parental participation would do more than ensure due process
rights-it could indicate to the parent that the process is meant to be therapeutic rather
than punitive. Furthermore, parental participation could be very valuable in developing a
plan of care for the child. For example, the parent could provide information as to the
needs of the child in placement.

1981-821
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Considerable controversy surrounds the issue of the appropriate standard of intervention. Some commentators, distrustful
of subjective judgments concerning parental fitness of quality of
home conditions, suggest that grounds for intervention must be
carefully and narrowly defined.48 This viewpoint rejects the
broad "best interests of the child" standard found in many state
statutes and often counsels judicial intervention only in specific
instances, generally occasions of serious physical abuse or neglect. 9 Critics of this restrictive approach suggest that such a standard, in effect, imposes a ban on court ordered intervention in
cases of "nonserious" harm and requires the same amount of
harm to be found before the court may order in-home services as
would be required for the court to order removal ° Proponents of
broader standards of intervention generally assert that greater
discretion in the standard of intervention is essential to protect
all children who may be endangered; they would leave the matter to the discretion of judges or welfare agencies. 51
The proposed Code would reject the restrictive intervention
approach. Evidence of this is found in the expansive reporting
provision and in the variety of dispositional alternatives, implying that intervention is contemplated even in cases of nonserious
harm. This conclusion is further supported by the fact that the
statute would permit intervention where there are reasonable
grounds to believe that abuse or neglect are present, 52 and would
define "abuse or neglect" in general terms.- The proposed Code
would go far beyond the restrictive approach and would expand
the definition of "abuse or neglect"5 to include physical or emo48 See, e.g., STANDARDS RELATING TO ABUSE AND NEGLECT § 2.1 (Tent. Draft 1977);
Mnookin, supranote 41; Wald, supra note 9, at 639.
49 See Wald, supranote9, at 700-01.
50 See Grumet, supra note 11, at 314. See Bourne & Newberger, supra note 12., for
an excellent critique of both the IJA-ABA and Wald's proposed standards.
51 See S. KATZ, WHEN PARENT FAIL 64-65 (1971); Levine, CaveatParens:A Demysttflcationofthe ChildProtectionSystem, 35 U. Prrr. L. 1Ev. 1,17 (1973).
52 See ch. 620, § 67(1).

M Ch. 600, § 2(1).
54 One authority provides a rationale for not distinguishing between abuse and ne-

glect as follows:
Child abuse and neglect are part of the same package. Of course, there often

is a difference between the neglectful parent and the abusive parent, and an

KENTUCKY LAW JOuRNAL

[Vol. 70

tional injury,S' sexual abuse or exploitation,58 and failure to provide adequate care or supervision, among others. Furthermore,

abuse could arise not only when these harms were inflicted by a
parent, but also when the parent allowed such harm to be inmeted by another, or created-or allowed to be created-the
risk of such harm.57 It may be argued that the abuses feared by
those favoring narrow bases of intervention are likely to arise
under such an expansive provision, but critics must keep in mind
the express statutory mandate to maintain the family unit, if at

all possible, and to use removal of the child only as the last resort.
The proposed Code would maintain the broad jurisdictional
grant of the current statutes, would refine them by providing

necessary definition, and would implement the policies behind
its promulgation by clearly setting forth dispositional alternatives
and procedural safeguards.
II.TERMINATION OF PARENTALCRIGHTS58

Even a system which attempts to preserve and strengthen
families must ultimately acknowledge that some children, re-

understanding of this difference is vital to treating the parent, and ultimately to saving the child, but, from the child's point of view, it is all maltreatment.
V. FONTANA, SOMEWHERE A CHILD IS CRYING 29 (1973).
5 Ch.600, § 2(1). As early as 1958, it was proposed that emotional neglect or harm
of children should be included in definitions of abuse or neglect. See R.MULFOID, EMOTIONAL NEGLECT OF CHILDREN 4 (1958). But see Mnookin, supra note 41. Legislators,
however, have been reluctant to give statutory recognition to such harm, which is difficult
to observe, demonstrate or prove. Sussman, supra note 15, at 264. The present statute includes "mental injury" as abuse, but fails to define it. See KRS § 199.011(6) (Cum. Supp.
1980). "Emotional injury" would be defined in the proposed Code as "an injury to the
mental or psychological capacity or emotional stability of a child as evidenced by a substantial and observable impairment in his ability to function within a normal range of performance and behavior with due regard to his culture or environment." Ch. 600, § 2(18).
56 Ch. 600, § 2(1). See McKerrow, Protectingthe Sexually Abused Child, SECOND
NATIONAL SYMPOSIUM ON CHILD ABUSE 40, 43 (1973). See also Commonwealth v. Boarman, 610 S.W.2d 922 (Ky..Ct. App. 1980) (sexual abuse of three-year-old female child by
adoptive father).
57 Seech. 600, § 2(1).
5 Chapter 625 of the proposed Code deals with the termination of parental rights.
The remainder of this article will address only the involuntary termination of parental rights. Under the proposed Code, procedural safeguards would be provided in instances of voluntary termination. See ch. 625, § 81.
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moved by court order, may never be returned to their homes.
Such a recognition is evident in the policy preamble of proposed
chapter 625, which, after reiterating the rights described in
chapter 620, states: "It is further recognized that upon some occasions, in order to protect and preserve the rights and needs of
children, it is necessary to remove a child from his or her parents
and even on some occasions to sever the parent-child relationship
permanently." 59
Termination proceedings raise complex issues of conflicting
interests and rights which are seldom dealt with adequately by
the statutes authorizing the termination. In such actions it is
necessarily required that the courtw° balance the rights and interests of the parents in meeting the challenges and responsibilities
of parenthood against the rights of the child to a sound and con6
structive family life and a chance for successful development. '
Every state has some statutory provision permitting termination
of parental rights.6 2 Typically, the issue arises: (1) in relation to
an adoption proceeding; (2) at the dispositional stage of a neglect
proceeding;6 or (3) at a termination proceeding-usually held
when a child has been in foster care for a period of time and a
permanent disposition is sought.4

59 Ch.625, § 77.
0 The circuit court would have jurisdiction over proceedings to terminate parental
rights under chapter 625. Ch. 625, § 79. The juvenile court session of the district court
would be empowered to make only temporary custody adjudications. Ch.620, § 66(1).
61See Gordon, supra note 12, at 216. Although parents enjoy constitutional rights to
privacy and autonomy which extend to decisions regarding the family, certain compelling
situations, such as parental abuse or neglect, require state intervention and derogation of
those rights. The state has a legitimate interest in the health and safety of all its citizens,
but it has a special interest in children because of their vulnerability. Thus the right to intervene derives from two sources: the state's police power, the authority to act as guardian
of the safety of all its citizens; and its parens patriae authority, the common law power to
act as a substitute parent to protect the child. See Comment, Involuntary Termination of
ParentalRights: The Need for Clearand Convincing Evidence, 29 AM. U.L. REV. 771,
778-79 (1980).
62
See Katz, Howe & McGrath, Child Neglect Laws in America, 9 FAM. L.Q. 1
(1975), for a list of these statutes and a brief discussion of each.
63 Termination of parental rights is not a dispositional alternative specifically articulated by the proposed statute, so it would not routinely be employed upon a finding of
abuse and neglect. Ch. 620, § 70. The listed alternatives, however, are not exclusive, and
termination could thus still be had if other precipitating factors were found.
64This part of this article will deal only with the latter two situations.

KENTUCKY LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 70

Regardless of the manner in which the issue is raised, the effect of termination is the same-the parent loses not only physical custody, as in temporary removal, but also the right to ever
regain custody. All parental legal rights are severed. Thus, the
need for definitive statutory criteria is clear. The bases for such
criteria, however, are less clear. 65 General standards, it is argued, permit wide judicial discretion and expand the "protective" jurisdiction of the court, but give little insight into what
judges expect from parents and social services providers. 6 On the
other hand, it is suggested that specific standards-such as those
focusing on duration of foster care-promote uniformity of application, but they also impose arbitrary deadlines and make
courts hesitant to make initial determinations of neglect. 67 The
approach of the proposed Code would balance these opposing
viewpoints. The vague "best interests of the child" criterion
would be supplemented with specific grounds for termination,
although length of time in foster care is not expressly among
those grounds.6
Basic provisions for termination of parental rights would remain substantially unchanged from the present provisions under

65 Some commentators suggest that the basis for intervention should focus on the
child. Indeed, this was the approach of the Institute of Judicial Administration/American
Bar Association Joint Committee on Juvenile Justice Standards, which focused on harm or
likelihood of harm. On the other hand, some experts have focused on parental fitness. For
an example of a statute reflecting the latter focus, see COLO. REv. STAT. § 19-11-105
(1978).
66 It has often been argued that statutes which base termination on parental unfitness are "void for vagueness." See, e.g., Alsager v. District Court, 406 F. Supp. 10 (S.D.
Iowa 1975), ajf'd fn part, 545 F.2d 1137 (8th Cir. 1976). Butsee Miller v. Alabama Dep't
of Pensions & See., 374 So. 2d 1370 (Ala. Civ. App. 1979). See generally Day, Termination of ParentalRights Statutes and the Void for Vagueness Doctrine:A Successful Attack
on the Parens Patriae Rationale, 16 J. FAM. L. 213 (1978); Comment, Application of the
Vagueness Doctrine to Statutes TerminatingParentalRights, 1980 DuKE L.J. 336.
67 Bourne & Newberger, supra note 12, at 694-95. See also Wald, supra note 9, at
692.
68 The "best interest of the child" would still be the primary consideration and criteria for voluntary termination of parental rights. Ch. 625, § 81(7). A list of aggravating
factors, included to aid in the determination, would seem to implicitly exclude length of
time in foster care. See ch. 625, § 86(1). Yet the list of factors would not be exclusive, and
length of time in foster care could be significant to that determination.
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the proposed Code.w An action for involuntary termination"

would be initiated upon the filing of a petition in circuit court.71
Mandatory parties to the action would include, but Would not be
limited to (1) the petitioner, (2) the Department for Human Re-

sources, (3) the natural parents, 72 if known, and (4) the child.7 3
As before, the parents' right to counsel would be preserved
and the court would be required to appoint counsel upon a finding that the parent is indigent. 7 A person of "reputable character" would be appointed as guardian ad litem for the child. 75
6 See KRS §§ 199.601-.617 (1977 & Cum. Supp. 1980). Many of the factors to be
considered would remain couched in the sarne terminology, although the statute, as proposed, has been restructured andclarified.
70 Ch. 625, § 82. Chapter 625 would aiso address the issues and procedures involved
in voluntary termination. The court would be required to set a date for the hearing within
three days after the petition was filed, and would have to find: (1) the person or agency to
whom custody of the child was to be given was willing and able to receive the child; (2)
that such termination was in the best interest of the child; and (3)
that the petitioner was
fully aware of the consequences of the proceeding. Ch. 625, § 81.
71 Ch. 625, § 82(1).
72 This would include, under some circumstances, the putative father of an illegitimate child. See Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645 (unwed fathers entitled to notice with respect to adoption and custody proceedings). See Barron, Notice to the Unwed Fatherand
Termination of ParentalRights: Implementing Stanley v. Illinois, 9 FAM. L.Q. 527
(1975), for an excellent discussion of the nature of the notice problem.
73 Ch. 625, § 83(1). The child would thus clearly be a mandatory party to both
voluntary and involuntary terminations under the proposed Code. Cf. KRS § 199.601
(Cum. Supp. 1980) (no mention of child as party to voluntary termination proceedings).
See Shield v. Barrow, 58 U.S. (17 How.) 409 (1854) (persons who should have party status
are those who have an interest of such a nature that a decree cannot be made without affecting that interest).
7'Ch. 625, § 85(3).
75 Ch. 625, § 85(2). It seems anomalous that, in a termination proceeding where the
intervention, and possible deprivation, would be of a permanent nature, the court would
not be required to appoint counsel for the child as it would have to in an abuse or neglect
proceeding. See ch. 620, § 66(4)(a)(1). While the proposed provision would only require
that the guardianadlitem be a person of "reputable character," many experts suggest that
the guardian should also be an attorney. For full party status-as would be accorded by
chapter 625-to be meaningful, the child would have to have independent counsel. As one
commentator has stated:
Ordinarily, the presumption exists that a child's parents are best suited to
represent and protect his interests. This presumption, however, should not
prevail when those same parents are charged with failing to provide the
child's minimum needs. Conflicts also arise between the interests of the child
and the practices and policies of both child care agencies and the state.
Note, Termination of ParentalRights-Suggested Reforms and Responses, 16 J. FAM. L.
239, 24546 (1977-78).
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Further provisions of the proposed chapter, particularly
those dealing with grounds for termination of parental rights,
would embody significant conceptual changes. As proposed, termination would be allowed only upon (1) a finding, by a preponderance of evidence, that the child is abused or neglected, (2) a
determination that termination would be in the best interest of
the child, and (3) a finding, upon clear and convincing evidence,
6
of one or more aggravating factors.7
The proposed provision would clearly indicate that the "best
interest of the child" is a factor quite distinct from the other statutory criteria.7 The factors to be used in determining the best
interest of the child would be specifically, but not exclusively,
enumerated. 8 For the most part, these statutory factors would be
framed in terms of parents' behavior, such as parental unfitness
and parental adjustment. Only one provision would be expressed

76 Ch. 625, § 86. Furthermore, even if all three criteria were met, if the parent established that there were reasonable grounds to believe that the injury would not recur in
the future, the court could decide not to terminate the parental rights. Id.
77 Whether this is also the intent of the present provision is certainly not clear. The
pertinent provision currently reads:
[T]he circuit court may terminate all parental rights ...if it

is... proved..

.

that the termination is in the best interest of the child

based on the existence of one (1) or both of the following conditions:
(a) The child has been abandoned; or
(b) The child has been substantially or continuously or repeatedly neglected
or abused.
KRS § 199.603(1) (Cum.Supp. 1980). Yet the same section also includes other factors to
be considered in determining the best interests of the child, some of which would be incorporated into the comparable proposed Code provision. See KRS § 199.603(3)(a)-(h)
(Gum. Supp. 1980). One commentator has observed: "The best interest standard is the
sole criterion in many custody disputes between two natural parents. In termination cases,
however, the court typically addresses this question only after other grounds for termination have first been established." Comment, supra note 61, at 781-82. See also Wasson v.
Wasson, 584 P.2d713 (N.M. Ct. App. 1978); In re Johnson, 100 N.W.2d 383 (Wis. 1960).
78 Ch.625, § 86(2)(a)-(e). They would include:
(a) Emotional illness, mental illness or mental deficiency of the parent... which renders the parent consistently unable to care for.. the
child for extended periods of time; (b) Acts of abuse or neglect toward any
child in the family; (c) ...[Wihether the department has rendered or attempted to render all reasonable services to the parent. . to bring about a
reunion of the family ...; (d) The effort the parent has made to adjust his
circumstances [or] conduct... ; (e) The physical, emotional and mental
health of the child....
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in terms of the child's well-being or status. 79
The required finding of aggravating factors, beyond a determination of abuse or neglect, would not alone be a significant departure from the present statute. Each of the listed aggravating
factors would itself be sufficient grounds to justify a finding of
abuse or neglect. That does not mean, however, that the proposed Code would merely require that two distinct grounds of
abuse or neglect be proven in order to terminate. If that were so,
termination might be had in nearly every abuse or neglect proceeding, since abuse or neglect seldom involves only one type of
harm. 0
The significant conceptual change would lie in the allocation
of the burden of proof. The proposed Code would require a finding of abuse or neglect by a preponderance of the evidence, and
in addition would require that the aggravating factor or factors
be established by clear and convincing evidence.8' Thus, the
"preponderance of the evidence" standard would no longer be
the standard to be applied in termination proceedings. For
example, under the proposed Code a claim of sexual abuse and
emotional injury, each proven only by a preponderance of the
evidence, would result only in a determination of abuse or neglect. However, if emotional injury were proven by a preponderance and the sexual abuse could be established by clear and convincing evidence, termination might be permitted. Further, inherent in each of the aggravating factors would be every ground
which might establish abuse or neglect. Therefore, if any one of

" Ch. 625, § 86(2)(e). In considering whether termination is appropriate, or in the
best interest of the child, special attention should focus on the child rather than the parent.
As one commentator has observed, it may be appropriate to consider if: (1) termination
would be detrimental to the child due to the strength of the parent-child relationship; (2)
the child could be placed with relatives who are willing to provide permanent care but do
not wish to adopt; (3) permanent family placement is unavailable or undesirable. Wald,
supra note 9, at 697-99. For example, in a minority of cases a child may be"unadoptable."
To terminate parental rights would leave the child without any parents if another home is
not available.
80 For example, it has been observed that abusive language and expressions of hostility-forms of nonphysical abuse-are common in nearly 80% of physically abusing families. L. YouNc, WEDNESDAYS CHiLDREN 60 (1964).
81 Ch. 625, § 86(1). The present provision, KRS § 199.603(1) (Cum. Supp. 1980),
requires proof by only a preponderance of the evidence.

KENTUCKY LAW JouRNAL

[Vol. 70

these aggravating factors should be established by clear and convincing evidence, termination might be had because such a finding would necessarily satisfy the preponderance of the evidence
standard for abuse and neglect as well. It must be remembered,
however, that termination could not be had even if these standards were met, absent a finding that it was also in the best interest of the child. 82 In keeping with the "least drastic alternative"
approach of the entire Code, in determining the child's best interest the court could consider the services the Department had
rendered or failed to render. 8
The significance of this change in the burden of proof should
not be underestimated.& It would reflect a belief that the integrity of the family unit and family autonomy are of fundamental
concern to our society. It would further reflect a belief that the
court should have jurisdiction to order services, and that the
threshold for this intervention should require substantial evidence, but that the greater intrusion of termination-marked by
its awesome finality-necessitates a higher threshold for intervention.
III.

STATUS OFFENDERS

A status offense85 is one committed by a child which would
not, but for his status as a child, 8 bring him within the jurisdic82 Although the proposed "best interests" standard would provide some criteria for

making the decision, it would remain an "indeterminate standard involving both uncertain predictions about the psychological impact of different custody dispositions and difficult value judgments about the proper character of intrafamily relationships." Comment,
supranote 61, at 782.

83 Seech. 625, § 86(2)(c).
84 For an excellent analysis of the rationale for-and impact of-varying standards
of proof in termination proceedings, see Comment, supranote 61.
85 The proposed Code would define the term as follows:
"Status offense" is any action brought in the interest of a child who is

accused of commiting acts, which if committed by an adult would not be a
crime. Such behavior shall not be termed criminal or delinquent, and such
children shall not be considered delinquent. Status offenses do not include
violation of state or local ordinances which may apply to juveniles such as a
violation of curfew or possession of alcoholic beverages.

Ch. 600, § 2(41).
86 "'Child' means any person who has not reached his eighteenth (18th) birthday."

Ch.600, § 2(3).
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tion of a court. Historically, statutes have created only two jurisdictional categories: "delinquent" and "dependent or neglected"
children A7 As neglect and dependency jurisdiction narrowed
over time, delinquency jurisdiction typically expanded to include
status offenses." Such "delinquents" included children found to
be "incorrigible," "wayward," "habitually disobedient," "runaways," and "truant.""9 Such offenses were often so broadly defined as to include "swearing," "immoral behavior" and "wandering at night"9 3-charges which were "easy to present and
usually impossible to controvert successfully." 91 Criticism for failure to differentiate between criminal and noncriminal offenders
mounted and, in the 1960's,92 this criticism resulted in the development of the "status offense" jurisdictional category. The statutory creation of such a category has alleviated some concerns, but
criticism of the juvenile justice system's failure to address the
unique problems of status offender jurisdiction has persisted and
93
grown.
Such criticisms have been grouped by one commentator into
four major categories.94 First, it is often argued that the status offender is treated harshly and inappropriately.9 Since status of-

87

See, e.g., Illinois Juvenile Court Act, 1899 ILL. LAWS 131-32, § 1.

88 See Comment, "DelinquentChild": A Legal Term Without Meaning, 21 BAYLOR

L. REV. 352 (1969).
89 See J. DINEEN, JUVENILE COURT ORGANIZATION AND STATUS OFFENSES: A STATUTORY PROFILE 33-45 (1974).

90 See, e.g., IND. CODE ANN. § 31-5-7-4 (Burns, repealed 1975).
91 M. MIDONEK & D. BEHAROV, CHILDREN, PARENTS AND THE COURTS: JUVENILE
DELINQUENCY, UNCOVERNABILITY AND NEGLECT 92(1972).
92 See, e.g., PRESIDENTS COMMISSION ON LAW ENFORCEMENT AND ADMINISTRATION

OF JUSTICE, TASK FORCE REPORT: JUVENILE DELINQUENCY AND YOUTH CRIME (1967). See

also In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1; Note, The Dilemmaof the "Uniquely Juvenile" Offender, 14
WM. & MARY L. REV. 386 (1972).
9 See, e.g., National Council on Crime and Delinquency, Jurisdictionover Status
Offenders Should Be Removed from the Juvenile Court, 21 CRIME & DELINQ. 97 (1975);
Sussman, Judicial Control over Noncriminal Misbehavior, 52 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1051
(1977); Note, Parens Patriae andStatutory Vagueness in the Juvenile Court, 82 YALE L.J.
745(1973).
94 Fisher, "Familieswith Service Needs":- The Newest Euphemism?, 18 J. FAM. L.
1 (1979-80).
95 Id. at 6. The author cites studies indicating that status offender detention rates
and length of stay in "training schools" equal or exceed equivalent figures for juvenile
criminal offenders. Id.
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fenses are often a symptom of family disturbance, the more appropriate focus of intervention should be on the family.96 Second,
status offense legislation is often vague and overbroad. Many statutes fail to give adequate notice of proscribed conduct and allow
excessive discretion to be used in enforcement."' Third, such
jurisdiction encourages false community reliance on the courts,
which have neither adequate methods nor resources to identify
and remedy causes of "deviant" conduct.98 It is argued that such
reliance "paradoxically retards the development of needed resources by feeding the community's complacency" regarding the
status offender.9° Fourth, critics urge a reallocation of scarce resources such as police, judicial time and correctional resources
from status offenses to neglect and delinquency actions. 1°° Most
commentators would agree that changes in the juvenile justice
system are essential in order to remedy these problems. Major
controversy still exists, however, between those who suggest
elimination of the courts' jurisdiction over status offenders 0 ' and
those who seek to retain but reform it. 102 The drafters of the proposed Code, by creating a completely new chapter for the treatment of status offenders, have chosen the latter course.
The jurisdictional offenses under the proposed Code would
remain essentially the same as those in present provisionsl1s The
96 See Arthur, Should Status Offenders Go to Court?, in BEYOND CONTROL: STATUS
OFFENDERS IN THE JUVENILE COURT 235,242 (L. Teitlbaum & A. Gough eds. 1977).
97 Fisher, supranote 94, at 8. See also Note, supra note 93.

98 Fisher, supra note 94, at 9. Fisher also presents a discussion of several reforms in
the law of juvenile status offenses.
99 Id. at 10. Federal Judge David Bazelon has expressed the same sentiment:
The situation is truly ironic. The argument for retaining... jurisdiction is that juvenile courts have to act in such cases because, "if we don't act,
no one else will." I submit that precisely the opposite is the case: becauseyou
act, no one else does. Schools and public agencies refer their problem cases to
you because you have jurisdiction, because you exercise it, and because you
hold out promises that you can provide solutions.
Bazelon, Beyond Controlof the Juvenile Court, 21 JUV. CT. JUDGES J.42,44 (1970).
100Fisher, supra note 94, at 10. See also STANDARDS RELATING TO NONCRIMINAL MISBEHAVIOR 4 (Tent. Draft 1977).
101See, e.g., Ketcham, Why Jurisdiction over Status Offenders Should Be EliminatedfromJuvenile Courts, 57 B.U.L. REV. 645 (1977).
102 See, e.g., Martin & Snyder, Jurisdictionover Status Offenders Should Not Be Removedfrom the Juvenile Court, 22 CIuME & DELINQ. 44 (1976).
103 "Status offender" presently includes a child "[w]ho does not subject himself to the
reasonable control of his parents, teacher, guardian or custodian, by reason of being way-
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juvenile court would have exclusive jurisdiction over any child
who allegedly: (1) has been a runaway; (2) has refused to subject
himself to the reasonable control of parents or school personnel;
or (3) has been a truant from school. 104 Although parallel provisions'05 may be found in the present statutes and the proposed
Code, the latter would differ significantly from the former by establishing statutory criteria and procedures expressly applicable
to status offenders, whereas current provisions seldom differentiate between dependency, status and public offense actions. Indeed, the proposed chapter would mandate that "[t]he Commonwealth's courts shall utilize a separate and distinct set of
guidelines for status offenders which reflect their individual
needs."'1 6
These "separate and distinct" guidelines would provide that
a peace officer' 01 could take a child into custody only (1) pursuant
to court order for failure to appear for a previous status offense or
(2) if "reasonable grounds to believe that the child has been an
habitual runaway exist."' 08 This temporary custody provision
would represent an exception to the chapter's prohibition of pre-

ward or habitually... truant ... from school." KRS § 208.020(1)(b)-(c) (Cu. Supp.
1980). "Runaway" is not expressly defined but such a child would fall within the first category.
'04 Ch. 630, § 91. However, the proposed Code would also provide that "[n]o child
shall be brought before the court for truancy unless an adequate assessment of the child
has been performed pursuant to KRS 159.140(3), (4) and (6) ....
Ch. 630, § 95(2).
105 See, e.g., KRS § 208.060 (Cu. Supp. 1980).
106 Ch. 630, § 90(1).
107 For a definition of "peace officer," see KRS § 61.300 (Cum. Supp. 1980). The
proposed provision appears to be a codification of current practice. The present provision,
KRS § 208.110(2) (1977), suggests that a child may be taken into custody by a private citizen, but it has been suggested that this section should be strictly construed and that no authority for a private citizen to "arrest" should be implied where the only charge would be a
status offense. See McAnulty & Baltzell, Juvenile Practice,ch. 4, § 4.01, in 4 BALDWIN'S
KENTUCKY PRACTICE (1979).

108 Ch. 630, § 92(1)-(2). While the first ground seems justifiable as necessary for enforcement of court orders, the second seems to embody great potential for abuse. Since the
provision is not specific, it appears that "reasonable grounds to believe the child has been a
habitual runaway" would mean less than a prior adjudication of a status offense based on
that charge and could mean that the child could be detained at the parent's complaint,
thereby placing the system's coercive power at the disposition of an angry or frustrated
parent. See ch. 630, § 92(2).
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adjudication detention'09 and would be predicated on the doubtful predictive value of past behavior. Arguably, the power to
take a child into custody is essential to assure his presence before
the court, particularly when he exhibits behavior which indicates
that such an appearance is unlikely. However, pre-adjudication
custody is, in effect, an arrest regardless of the criterion or terminology, and it confers upon the child the stigma of "delinquent"-the very result which this jurisdictional category intends to avoid. Although the stigma of arrest is unavoidable,
some procedural safeguards would be afforded the child. Upon
taking a child into custody the officer would have to obtain
prompt medical treatment if necessary and contact a court designated worker (CDW).° It would then be the responsibility of
the CDW to determine the appropriate temporary disposition of
the child, a determination which is within the province of the arresting officer under present provisions."' The statutorily designated options available to the CDW would be: (1) to release the
child to the parent upon the parent's promise to bring the child
before the court or CDW as required; (2) to release the child to
another responsible adult under the same conditions; or (3) to de2
liver the child to an emergency shelter-care facility."

Only when all of these options were exhausted

3

would the

109"Detention of status offenders should only be used for very specific and constructive purposes, when all other least restrictive alternatives to detention have been attempted and are not feasible." Ch. 630, § 90(3). See also ch. 630, § 96 ("No child shall be
detained as a means or form of punishment.").
110 "Court designated worker" means that organization or individual delegated by the administrative office of the courts for the purposes of placing
children in alternative placements prior to arraignment, conducting preliminary investigations, and for purposes of formulating, entering into and
supervising diversion agreements and performing such other functions as
authorized by law or court order.
Ch. 600, § 2(8).
'11
See KRS § 208.110(3)-(4) (1977).
112 Ch. 630, § 93(2)(a)-(c). An emergency shelter care facility would be defined as a
"group home, private residence, foster home, or similar home like facility which provides
temporary or emergency care of children and adequate staff and services consistent with
the needs of each child." Ch. 600, § 2(16).
n3 The use of the word "exhausted," although undefined, would imply that placement in non-secure facilities, even if available, could not be used if determined to be inappropriate or ineffective. This seems to be particularly harsh. Incarceration upon probable
cause of a noncriminal offense arguably constitutes a violation of substantive due process
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child be placed in a secure facility. 114 If the child were not released to his parents or another responsible adult, the officer
would have to file a complaint with the court within three
hours," 5 and a hearing on the detention would have to be held
within forty-eight hours." 6 In order to continue any detention of
the child, there would have to be probable cause to believe that a
status offense had been committed by the child," 7 and further
holding of the child in secure detention would require that a
great burden of proof be met. The Commonwealth would be
forced to show that all other placement alternatives had been exhausted and to establish the presence of at least one aggravating
factor."8 Among these factors would be, disturbingly, a finding
that "[tihe child is a danger to himself or others."" 9 Although the
provision seems reasonable on its face, when the proposed provision is considered in light of the statutory definition of "dangerous," it becomes apparent that any runaway or otherwise "defiant" child who has not had the foresight to make "provision for
reasonable shelter, food,. or clothing,"12° could, under some ciras well as cruel and unusual punishment. See Rosenberg & Rosenberg, The Legacy of the
Stubborn and Rebelious Son, 74 MIcH.L. REv.1097,1123-34 (1976). However, to permit
secure detention in some instances would be consistent with the grounds for which any
pre-adjudication detention could be obtained at all, i.e., the determination that the child
would be, to some degree, "uncontrollable."
114 A "secure detention facility" would be defined as a "physically secure setting
which is entirely separated from sight and sound from all other portions of the jail containing adult prisoners or a facility operated so as to insure that all entrances and exits are
under the exclusive control of the facility staff." Ch. 600, § 2(37).
,IsCh. 630, § 93(4). The peace officer would also have to make a reasonable effort
to give verbal notice to the parent and provide a written statement of reasons for taking
the child into custody to the court designated worker. Ch. 630, § 93(3). Cf KRS §
208.110(3) (1977) (also requires the officer to state the date, time, and place of the detention hearing). A similar requirement would be found in the general provisions of the proposed Code. See ch. 610, § 38.
116 Ch. 630, § 96. Under the present provision, a detention hearing must be held
within 72 hours. KRS § 208.192(2) (1977). Under either provision, if the hearing is not
held, the court must release the child.
"17Ch. 630, 97(1). See also Breed v. Jones, 421 U.S. 519 (1975).
118 Ch. 630, 5 97(1). Compare ch. 630, § 97(1) with KRS § 208.192(4)(d) (1977).
KRS § 208.192(4)(d) (1977) states: "Secure detention for status offenders is to be used in
only those cases when the court is of the opinion that other alternatives are either not
available or cannot provide the degree of control and safety necessary to assure the safety
and security of the child." Id.
119Ch.630, § 97() (0.
,1."'Dangerous' means danger, threat of danger to self or others, which results in
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cumstances, find himself detained behind lock and key. Apparently "an aggravating factor" would be nothing more than one
for which jurisdiction could initially be had, and would not, in
reality, impose a greater burden for obtaining secure detention.
In any event, no child could be held in secure detention pending
adjudication for more than ten days after the detention hearing,
unless that limit was waived by the child.' 2'
Still conspiciously absent from the proposed statute is any express limitation on the length of time a child could be held in
non-secure detention. Thus, it is unclear whether, upon expiration of the maximum time of secure detention, the child would
be released or if he could continue to be detained in a non-secure
setting. To say a child should be held until there is an adjudicatory hearing provides no answer, since the general provisions of
the Code would require only that the hearing be speedy but
would not require that this be done within a determinate time.'2
In any event, notice would have to be given at least seventy-two
hours prior to the hearing. '12

In an attempt to restrict judicial intervention in status offense matters, the proposed Code would require that any complaining party confer with a court designated worker prior to the
commencement of an action. 2" The duty of the CDW would be
substantial physical harm ...to self or others, including actions which deprive self or
others of the basic means of survival, including provisions for reasonable shelter, food or
clothing." Ch. 600, § 2(11). The secure detention provision would specifically exempt a
child suspected of having a mental or emotional disorder; it would indicate that such children should be dealt with in accordance with chapter 645. Ch. 630, § 97(1)(f).
121 Ch. 630, § 99. In a formal proceeding, rights of the child would belong to him
and could not be waived by his parents, guardian or any other person exercising custodial
control, and it seems logical that the same would be true here. See ch. 610, § 24(5). Comparech. 610, § 24(5) with ch. 620, § 67(2) (the proposed Codes temporary custody provision for abuse and neglect actions in which a parental request could extend temporary custody).
122 See ch. 610, § 25(1).
123Ch. 610, § 47(2). Under the present statute, KRS § 208.110 (1977), it has been
held that the failure to give notice does not render a prior detention hearing void if the
child was represented by counsel. See Anderson v. Commonwealth, 465 S.W.2d 70 (Ky.
1971).
124See ch. 630, § 94. This could codify actual practice in many jurisdictions where
social agencies and others conduct the "court's" preliminary inquiry as to whether further
formal action should be taken. Since the jurisdiction of the court would not yet have attached, neither the court designated worker nor the court would have the power to make
the determination of referral to appropriate services legally binding.
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to determine whether to refer the matter to the court or to refer
the child and family to a public or private social service agency.11 If the CDW were to refer the matter to the court, the bifurcated adjudicatory and dispositional hearing provisions of chapter 610 would come into play.Ise The purpose of the adjudicatory
hearing would be to determine the truth or falsity of the complaint. The child would be entitled to the full range of constitutional rights to which an adult is entitled and all adjudication
would have to be supported by evidence beyond a reasonable
doubt.'- No status offender could be held in secure detention
pending disposition for more than ten days.' At the dispositional hearing the court would be required to determine that all appropriate remedies had been considered and exhausted and only
then could the court order the child and family to participate in
any programs.'
Although chapter 630 does not so state, chapter 610, which
details procedures generally applicable to the entire proposed
Code, states that an "informal adjustment may be made at any
time during the proceeding."' 3 Thus the court could refer the
child and family to appropriate services without the coercive
force of a court order. "Appropriate" remedies fashioned by the
court would be subject to two conditions: (1) treatment programs
would have to be community based and non-secure, and (2) "educational" programs would have to meet with the approval of
3
the Department of Education and the receiving agency.' '
If all other resources were found insufficient to address the
needs of the child and his family, the court could commit the
121 Ch. 630, § 94.
12 Since chapter 630 would contain no specific provisions on point, the general pro-

visions of the proposed Code would have to control with regard to the proper notice, summons and conduct of the hearing.
127 Ch. 610, § 26(2).
128Ch. 630, § 99. Again, this detention limit could be waived by the child for an ad-

ditional 10 days. It should also be noted that there appears to be no statutory limitation in
the proposed Code on the amount of time a child could be held in non-secure detention
pending disposition.
Ch.630, § 100(2)-(3).
130 Ch. 610, § 28(3). Since jurisdiction of the court would have attached at the point
of this informal disposition, the court would have the power to make its determination of
informal adjustment legally binding. See Cullin v. Williams, 160 S.W. 733 (Ky. 1913).
131 Ch. 630, § 101(1)(a)-(b).
'12
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child to the Department for Human Resources. 132 The Department would have to consider all appropriate local remedies and
would be subject to the same conditions of placement as the
court. An order of commitment could be reviewed, continued or
terminated on the court's own motion or on motion by, among
others, the child or his family, guardian or counsel13 The Department for Human Resources, as well as the court, could bring
an action against the parents for failure to cooperate or to participate in treatment or social service programs. 1-4
Underlying these proposed provisions is the belief that not
only should status offender jurisdiction be retained, but that it
should be expanded to give courts the power to address the problems of the offender's family and to order public agencies to provide needed services.
The drafters may have based this policy, as others have,"'- on
three basic contentions. First, although some harmful intervention may occur from such expanded jurisdiction, the proper remedy is to divert more cases from the court instead of discarding
the court's jurisdiction completely. Second, although services
provided and received on a voluntary basis would be the therapeutic ideal, the courts are needed as a last resort to force some
agencies to provide, and some families to accept, needed services.
Third, since communities will not tolerate leaving disturbed or
defiant youngsters without treatment, and courts will not abdicate their responsibilities to these children, the abandonment of
status offender jurisdiction would result in subjecting these chil6
dren to delinquency jurisdiction. 13
132 Ch. 630, § 101(2). All commitments would be for an indeterminate period of
time, not to exceed the child's 18th birthday. Dispositional alternatives available to the department for a child committed to it would be those found in ch. 605, § 11(1)(a)-(O. A list
of community resources available to the department appears in BUREAU FOR SOCIAL SERVICES. KENTUCKY DEPARTMENT FOR HUMAN RESOURCES, COMMUNITY BASED AND RESIDENTIAL TREATMENT PROGRAMS FOR JUVENILES (1979).
133 Ch. 610, § 30(1)(a)-(d).
:34 See ch. 610, § 34; ch. 630, § 101(2)(d). These provisions would vest the court

with more authority to coerce participation in treatment programs.
135 See, e.g., Arthur, Status Offenders Need Help, Too, JUv. JUST., Feb. 1975, at 3,
7; Guy, It Would Not BeA CrimeIf YOURan Away, Juv. JuST., Nov. 1977, at 39.
136 This summary of the anti-abolitionist philosophy is found in an excellent analysis
of various approaches to the status offender problem. Fisher, supra note 94, at 21.
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Laudable in its intent, proposed chapter 630 would nevertheless fail in several respects. First, although the proposed chapter would embody the policy that status offenses reflect, as often
as not, the failure of the community or family to meet children's
needs, each jurisdictional ground would focus on juvenile misconduct. Second, the new jurisdictional offenses would indicate
little effort to reform the vagueness of the present statute. What
is "reasonable parental control"? How far and how long must
one run to be a "runaway"? The single status offense defined by
the proposed statute as "habitual truant"' 3'7 would proscribe conduct engaged in by nearly all children at some point in time. As
one commentator has suggested:
The vagueness of [such] grounds might well perpetuate
the... system's punitive bias against children. Given wide
leeway, most enforcement officials probably tend to take the
parents' viewpoint. Whether this is because most adults empathize with parents rather than non-conforming adolescents, or
because bureaucrats inevitably exercise discretion to favor the
more powerful members of the community, the vacuum
created by vague definitions permits this to occur more

easily.'-"
Third, although the chapter would expressly provide that "[n]o
child shall be detained as a means or form of punishment,""' adequate measures to insure enforcement of this provision do not
appear in this chapter. As one authority has noted: "Punishment.., must be seen as the coerced loss of personal liberty,
totally independent of why the coercion is applied. Involuntariness is the touchstone."'' 4 Procedural safeguards against misuse of
137 "'Habitual truant' means any child who has been found by the court to have
been absent from school without valid excuse for more than three (3) days." Ch. 600, §
2(20). Other proposed codes would leave to the court's discretion the number of absences
needed to constitute truancy, suggesting that it should be a "number high enough to exclude the occasional days missed through caprice or impulse, but low enough to allow the
family court to deal promptly with the problem of the habitually absent child in need of
services." TAsK FORCE ON JUVENILE JUSTICE AND DELINQUENCY PREVENTION OF THE NATIONAL ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON CRIMINAL JUSTICE STANDARDS AND GOALS, JUVENILE JUSTICE AND DELINQUENCY PREVENTION § 10.5 commentary, at 325 (1977).
138 Fisher, supra note 94, at 31 (citations omitted).
139 Ch. 630, § 96.
140 Fox, The Reform of Juvenile Justice: The Child's Right to Punishment, JUV.

JuST., Aug. 1974, at2, 8.
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detention in abuse and neglect proceedings, such as the general
requirement of an adjudication within twenty-one days41' and
mandatory six month 42 review, are absent from the proposed
chapter, even though many dispositional alternatives would be
similar. 143
Finally, although expanded jurisdiction over the child's family is consistent with the premise that the family is the appropriate target for intervention, at least one commentator has suggested that such jurisdiction raises significant constitutional issues44 and has concluded that "[t]he court's exercise of dispositional power over family members other than the one who has
engaged in the designated deviant behavior may well result in a
'grievous loss of personal liberty."" 45
IV.

THE PUBLIC OFFENDER

As noted in the foregoing discussion, there is little consensus
regarding which acts should fall within an appropriate definition
of delinquency. Most commonly found to be within the statutory
definitions of delinquent, however, is the child who "violates the
law or ordinance."'14 This approach, as before, would provide

the basis for the proposed Code's public offender jurisdiction. 147

141Ch.
142 Ch.

620, § 66(4)(b).
620, § 75(1)(a).
143Comparech. 620, § 70 with ch. 605, § 11(1)(a)-(f).
144 Fisher, supranote 94, at 45.
145Id. See also Streib, Juvenile CourtsShould Not MandateParentalInvolvement in
Court-OrderedTreatment Programs,Juv. & FAm. CT. J., May 1978, at 49, 53. Streib observes:
[A] mandatory program of parental involvement is unjustifiable unless some
assurance can be made that the parents will receive significant levels and
meaningful kinds of aid in dealing with their children. To require participation in such a program without such assurances would tend to raise false
hopes for the children and parents and to operate more as a nuisance than as
a meaningful activity.
Id.
146 See C. VEDDER, JUVENILE OFFENDERS 6 (1979).
147Currently, KRS § 208.010(7) (1977) defines public offenses as offenses "which if
committed by an adult would be a crime." Id. Specifically excluded from the jurisdiction
of the juvenile court are moving motor vehicle offenses involving a child over 16. KRS §
208.020(1)(a) (Cum. Supp. 1980). There would be no comparable provision in the proposed Code.
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A delinquency action would be one which, if committed by an
adult, would be a crime; it would include felonies, misdemeanors, and violations. 48 Although jurisdiction over and procedures
relating to delinquency actions would remain much the same as
those under present provisions, several significant changes would
be made under the proposed Code to lessen the possibility of inappropriate intervention by the juvenile court.
First, chapter 635 would reflect a philosophical and dispositional distinction between serious and repeated offenders and
those who are lesser or first time offenders. The former could be
dealt with by the circuit court while the latter would remain
within the juvenile court's public offender jurisdiction.1 9 Second, this chapter would incorporate the use of court designated
workers who, in addition to intake and screening duties, would
be empowered to enter into diversionary agreements with the
child, thereby diverting appropriate juveniles from further involvement with the court.'50 Third, the proposed chapter would
expand both pre- and post-adjudication dispositional alternatives.
As with other types of behavior which would fall under the
proposed Code, the alleged public offense would be brought to
the attention of the juvenile justice system upon the filing of a
complaint.'," Prior to any action upon the complaint, though,
several steps of review would be required. Initially, any com148 Ch. 600, § 2(12). Since the proposed definitions would include "violations" specifically, any existing statutory ambiguity as to which court has jurisdiction of these offenses should be cleared up. Previously, "public offense" was defined in terms of a crime,
and a crime was defined as a "misdemeanor or a felony." KRS § 500.080(2) (Cum. Supp.

1980).
149 If, before an adjudicatory hearing under the proposed Code, reasonable cause

existed to believe that the child had committed a felony (other than a capital offense, a
Class A or Class B felony), a misdemeanor or a violation, the court would have to proceed

in accordance with chapter 635. Ch. 635, § 105(1); ch. 635, § 106(1). "All complaints
which constitute a capital offense or Class A or B felony or a youth [sic] under the provisions of KBS Chapter 640 shall be set for arraignment." Ch. 635, § 105(1).
150 KRS § 208.070(1) (Cum. Supp. 1980) presently directs "the court" to make preliminary inquiries.
151 The complaint would have to be a verified statement setting forth allegations
about the child containing sufficient facts for the formulation of a subsequent complaint.
Ch. 600, § 2(6). Under present provisions formal proceedings are initiated by a "petition."
KRS § 208.070 (Cum. Supp. 1980). The language of the proposed Code at times makes

reference to both terms. See ch. 600, § 2(6); ch. 635, § 105(1) (0.
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plaint filed would be received by a CDW,152 who would have the
responsibility of determining if the alleged offense fell within the
purview of the chapter. If so, the offense would then be reviewed
to determine the necessity of action. 1 The complaint could be
investigated further if incomplete, could be dismissed, or could
be proceeded on at the discretion of the county attorney or his
designee. If the latter course were chosen, the CDW would have
to conduct a preliminary intake inquiry to determine the feasibility of an informal resolution of the complaint. 1, This determination would necessarily, for practical and due process reasons, involve participation by the accused child. Therefore, prior to the
inquiry, the child and his parents would be informed: 155 (1) of
their right to be present, with counsel if desired; (2) that their
participation would be voluntary; (3) that information obtained
therein would be privileged; and (4) of the child's right to deny
the charges and request a formal hearing. 56 Following the preliminary inquiry, the CDW could choose to proceed with the filing of a petition or to proceed with a diversionary agreement.
That determination, and the criteria therefor, would have to be
presented to the child in a formal conference.'5 If the CDW
152 See ch. 605, § 6. The proposed Code would permit a court designated worker to
"(1) receive complaints; (2) investigate complaints; (3) recommend disposition of complaints; (4) make dispositional recommendations; (5) administer oaths; (6) issues sum-

monses; (7) issue subpoenas... ." Id.
153 Ch. 635, § 105(1)(a). The county attorney would be responsible for reviewing

each complaint. Id.
154 Ch. 635, § 105(1)(b). The decision whether or not to proceed would not be entirely within the discretion of the county attorney or the court designated worker (CDV),
however. If the CDW were to recommend that no petition be filed, the complainant or
victim of the offense would be so advised and would have 10 days within which to submit
a complaint for special review. See ch. 635, § 105(c)-(d). There is no equivalent provision
in the present statute.
155 Ch. 635, § 105(1)(e) would require that the diversionary agreement be accepted
voluntarily by the child and his parents, custodians or guardians. For a discussion of parental participation in the treatment of public offenders, see Janeksela, MandatoryParental Involvement in the Treatment of "Delinquent"Youth, Juv. & FAM. CT. J., Feb. 1979,
at 47. Janeksela suggests: "Mandatory parental involvement need not imply coercion. In
most cases, it will facilitate partnership within the juvenile court system in order to find
solutions to the juvenile's problem." Id. at 50.
156 Ch. 635, § 105(b)(1)-(5). The notice of voluntary participation to the child and
parents might be of little consolation since failure to "voluntarily participate" could jeopardize an informal resolution of the complaint should be deemed impossible and result in
the subsequent filing of a petition.
157 Ch. 635, § 105(1)(c).
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recommended that no petition be filed, the worker and child
could enter into a voluntary diversionary agreement.""e The
agreement might involve any program or effort which could
reasonably benefit the community and the child. The agreement
could include: (1) an informal plan of services provided by the
court or its staff; (2) referral of the child to a public or private organization or agency; (3) referral to a community service program; or (4) restitution. 59
No diversionary agreement would be allowed to extend for
longer than six months,' ® and, if its provisions were successfully
completed, the complaint would be dismissed."' In the event
that the complaint was not dismissed and a petition was filed,
the court would then proceed in accordance with the general
provisions of the Code found in chapter 610.162 At the adjudicatory hearing, upon motion by the child, the rules of criminal procedure would be applicable and all adjudications would have to
be supported by evidence beyond a reasonable doubt.' Pending
disposition, it would be within the court's power to detain the
child or to order an evaluation of the child by a mental health
professional. 164 The court also would retain the power to adjust
the case informally or to dispose of the case formally by one of the
following alternatives: (1) ordering the child to make restitution; 1' (2) placing the child on probation in his own home or in

158 Ch. 635, § 105(1)(e). The purpose of the diversion agreement would be "to serve
the best interest of the child and to provide redress for those offenses without court action
and without the creation of a formal court record." Ch. 600, § 2(15).
159 Ch. 635, § 105(1)(e).
6 Id.
161 Ch. 635, § 105(l)().
102 Ch. 635, § 105(1)(g). See, e.g., ch. 610, § 20 (filing of complaint); ch. 610, § 22
(summons and notice); ch. 610, § 24 (preliminary appearance before the court; explanation of rights).
163 Ch. 610, § 26(2). Upon motion of the child the rules of criminal procedure would
apply to public offender actions and to any status offender action except one in which it
was alleged that the child was an habitual runaway. Id.
164 Ch. 635, § 109(1)-(2). The proposed Code would provide: "[A] determination by
the court that detention pending disposition is necessary shall be based on a finding of the
court by a preponderance of the evidence that the circumstances surrounding the child are
such as to endanger his safety or welfare or that of the community." Ch. 635, § 109(1).
16 Ch. 635, § 10(1). Comparech. 635, § 110(1) with KRS § 208.240 (Cum. Supp.
1980) (restitution or reparation). For a description of alternative approaches to restitution
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another suitable home, subject to the court's jurisdiction until
age eighteen; 166 (3) committing the child to the Department for
Human Resources or to another institution, with advisory recommendations for placement if desired; 167 (4) (if the child is fourteen
or older) ordering participation in a community work service
program designed to promote the rehabilitation of the child, for
a period not to exceed 120 hours; 16 8 or (5) (if the child is over sixteen) ordering the child to pay a fine, upon a finding that the

developed by a group of juvenile courts, see Schneider & Schneider, An Overview of Restitution ProgramModels in the JuvenileJusticeSystem, Juv. & FAI. CT. J., Feb. 1980, at3.
166 Ch. 635, § 110(2). Compare ch. 635, § 110(2) with KRS § 208.200(1) (a) (Cum.
Supp. 1980). Regarding this type of alternative, the Attorney General has observed:
The situation of "house arrest" [where the juvenile is placed in the custody of
his parents] would nevertheless be an attempt by the juvenile court to exercise control over the juvenile and would be a deprivation of his liberty interests. As such, the requirements of due process... must be met by the juvenile court.
Op. Ky. Att'y Gen. 78-677 (1978).
167 Ch. 635, § 110(3). Such commitments would be for indeterminate periods of
time, not to exceed the child's 18th birthday. Id. Since there would be no lower age limits
on public offender jurisdiction, commitment to the department could be for a considerable length of time. Compare ch. 635, § 110(3) with CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 731
(West Supp. 1982). The California statute states:
A minor committed to the ... Youth Authority may not be held in physical
confinement for a period of time in excess of the maximum period of imprisonment which could be imposed upon an adult convicted of the offense or
offenses which brought or continued the minor under the jurisdiction of the
juvenile court.
CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 731 (West Supp. 1982). For a list of dispositions which would
be available to the department for a child committed to it, see ch. 605, § 11(1). See also
Butler, A Study on the Issue of Indeterminate Versus Determinate Sentencing, Juv. &
Fm. CT. J., Nov. 1979, at 39. Compare People v. Olivas, 551 P.2d 375 (Cal. 1976) with
In re T.D., 410 N.E.2d 275 (Ill. App. Ct. 1980).
168 Ch. 635, § 112(1). The present provisions permit such a disposition only if the
child is 16 years of age or older. KRS § 208.200(4)(a) (Cum. Supp. 1980). The Washington
Court of Appeals recently held that an order of 50 hours of community service to be performed by a juvenile who pled guilty to theft constituted "punishment for crime" and
therefore did not violate the thirteenth amendment prohibition against involuntary servitude. In re Erickson, 604 P.2d 513 (Wash. Ct. App. 1979). The validity of that argument
has been called into question, however, by the Washington Supreme Court in a 1980 decision emphasizing the language of the statute there in question, which provides: "An order
of court adjudging a child delinquent.., shall in no case be deemed conviction of
crime." In re Frederick, 604 P.2d 953, 954 (Wash. 1980). Language nearly identical to
that found in the pertinent statute in Frederickis found in the proposed Code. See cl. 635,
§ 108.
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child is financially able to do so.'1 The court would also be given
dispositional alternatives for children who clearly, by statutory
decree, should be dealt with under the chapter 640 youthful offender provisions. 170 Under the proposed Code, the court, in its
discretion, could commit a child over fourteen years old (adjudicated delinquent in the commission of a capital offense, Class A
or Class B felony) or a child over sixteen years old (adjudicated
delinquent of repeated felony offenses) to the Department for
Human Resources for the purpose of institutionalization for up to
one year.' 7' While this arrangement seems curious on its face, its
purpose would be to allow the disposition of children who have
committed serious offenses, but who would not fall within the
provisions allowing transfer to circuit court and who therefore
would be retained in the juvenile system. 172
Although significantly more treatment oriented than the provisions of the youthful offender chapter, chapter 635 would hold
its own Sword of Damocles dangling over the heads of children
within its jurisdiction: if the Department should find that a child
committed to it, by reason of the commission of a public offense
constituting a felony, is incapable of benefiting from treatment
by the Department's facilities for public offenders it could transfer the child to the youthful offender program. 73
The above provision and others, such as those that would
permit indeterminate commitment to the Department for Human Resources, would reflect, in part, an intent to "get tough"
with the public offender. Yet, for the most part, this chapter
would indicate a commitment to community based diversion and
treatment for the child. Lest this be construed as indicative of
legislative ambivalence toward the treatment of the public offender, it should be noted that there would be commendable

169 Ch. 635, § 112(2). A comparison with the equivalent provision now in effect,
KRS § 208.200(4)(b) (Cum. Supp. 1980), indicates that the fines proposed under the new
Code would be significantly higher.
170 Seech. 635, §§ 105(1), 106(2)-(5).
171 Ch. 635, § 113(1)-(2). But see Isralowitz, Deinstitutionalizationand the Serious

Juvenile Offender, Juv. & F/m. CT. J., Aug. 1979, at 21.
17-2See ch. 635, § 115(3).
173 Ch. 635, § 114(4). There are apparently no provisions for a hearing within the
Department for Human Resources or for judicial review before such a transfer is made.
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consistency in this part of the proposed Code. From the juvenile's

initial involvement with the CDW and the possibility of a consensual, informal resolution among the court, the complainant
and the accused, to the expanded dispositional alternatives in
formal proceedings before the court, the emphasis would be juvenile accountability and intervention appropriate to the offense.
V.

THE YOUTHFUL OFFENDER

The problem of how to define and treat the serious youthful
offender is a complex issue which has plagued both theorists and
practitioners.' 74 As in other areas of juvenile law and policy, the
"punishment vs. rehabilitation" debate rages on, perhaps made
even more complicated in this area by the nagging suspicion that
75
nothing works for the serious juvenile offender.
The ratio of violent youthful crime to total youth crime is relatively low. 7 6 But the fact that young people are involved in both

violent and repetitive criminal activity startles, confuses and
angers the public.17 As pointed out by one writer: "The public is
not clamoring to be of assistance to juveniles who have been
guilty of murder, armed robbery, rape, aggravated assault and
arson."178

174 See Campbell, Feathersin the Aquarium and Fish Scales in the Bird Cage: One
judge's Personal View of the Juvenile Justice System, 1 J. Joy. L. 79 (1977); Isralowitz,
supra note 171, at 21; McGoldrick, Juvenilejustice and the EqualProtectionClause: First
Class, Tourist, or Luxury Coach, 6 PEPPERDINE L. REV. 697 (1979); Speca & White, Variations and Trends in Proposed Legislation on Juvenile Courts, 40 U. Mo. KAN. CITY L.
REV. 129 (1972); Taylor, The Serious Juvenile Offender: Identification and Suggested
Treatment Responses, Juy. & FAM. CT. J., May 1980, at 23; Note, A Modelfor the Transferof Juvenile Felony Offenders to Adult Court Jurisdiction,4 J. Joy. L. 170 (1980).
17 See Taylor, supranote 174, at 23.
176 Id. Taylor cites the statistic, among others, that "in 1974, out of approximately
37,000 to 40,000 children residing in institutions, only 6,000 had committed serious (assaultive) crimes." Id. at 24.
177 See White, Debunking Three Myths About America's Children and the Courts
That Serve Them, Joy. & FAM. CT. J., Aug. 1979, at 3. The author contends that such adverse sentiment is growing in the face of evidence indicating that juvenile crime is decreasing. Id. Others maintain that the problem of serious juvenile crime has reached epidemic
proportions. See Note, supra note 174.
178 D. MANN, LAW ENFORCEMENT ASSISTANCE ASS'N, U.S. DErT. OF JUSTICE, INTER-

VENING WITH CONVICTED SERIOUS JUVENILE OFFENDERS 95

(1976).
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The demands of the public for law and order in the juvenile
justice process have resulted in the direction of increased attention to the problem of the serious juvenile offender in Kentucky
as well as other states. 179 The responses of legislatures considering
the problem have focused primarily on the trial of the juvenile as
an adult and on incarceration. 80
The drafters of the proposed Code in Kentucky have dealt
with this problem by: (1) creating diversion options at each stage
of the juvenile court process, from complaint through disposition, to skim off the less serious, less violent and less chronic offenders; (2) creating a variety of community based alternatives
for the nonserious offender; and (3) creating an entirely new
chapter to provide improved procedures which permit jurisdiction of a child, who is alleged to be a serious or repeated offender, to be transferred to the circuit court. Our concern for the
moment will be with the third category, the "youthful offender."81
Youthful offender jurisdiction would be defined in terms of
both age and offense. A youthful offender would be: (1) a child
over the age of fourteen who has been charged with a capital offense, a Class A felony or a Class B felony; 82 (2) a child over the
age of sixteen who is charged with a Class C or Class D felony
with two separate prior felony adjudications;"" or (3) any pre-

179See Statementof William S. White, 6 PEPPERDINE L. REv. 597, 602 (1979).
180Id. See also R. GOTTESMAN,THE CHILD AND THE LAW 23 (1981).
181 "Youthful offender" is defined as "any person regardless of age, transferred to cir-

cuit court under the provisions of KRS Chapter 640." Ch. 600, § 2(43). Age restrictions
are imposed by the transfer provisions. Ch.635, § 106(2)-(3).
182 Ch. 640, § 115(1); ch. 635, § 106(2). Capital offenses include murder for profit

or hire as well as murder occurring in the commission of arson, robbery, first degree rape
or burglary. KRS § 507.020(2) (Cum. Supp. 1980). Class A felonies include: murder, KRS
§ 507.020(2) (Cum. Supp. 1980); first degree rape when the victim is under 12 years of age
or receives serious physical injury, KRS § 510.040(2) (1975); and first degree sodomy

when the victim is under 12 or receives serious physical injury, KRS § 510.070(2) (1975).
Class B felonies include: manslaughter in the first degree, KRS § 507.030(2) (1975); as-

sault in the first degree, KRS § 508.010(2) (1975); rape in the first degree, KRS §
510.040(2) (1975); and burglaryin the first degree, KRS § 511.020(2) (Gum. Supp. 1980).
183 Ch. 640, § 115(1); ch. 635, § 106(3). Class C felonies include: manslaughter in

the second degree, KRS § 507.040(2) (1975); assault in the second degree, KRS §
508.020(2) (1975); second degree rape, KRS § 510.050(2) (1975); and first degree sodomy,
KRS § 510.080(2) (1975). Class D felonies include: wanton endangerment in the first de-
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viously convicted youthful offender who is charged with another
felony. 1 4 The proposed Code would depart from the present provisions by establishing a lower age limit below which no child
could be transferred to circuit court. Heretofore, a child sixteen
or over committing a felony or any child, regardless of age, committing a Class A felony or capital offense could be transferred to
circuit court. 15

Most juvenile court personnel and judges regard the transfer
of jurisdiction as the most severe sanction that may be imposed
by the juvenile court. 8 ' One commentator has noted that "[niot
only is the juvenile exposed to the probability of severe punishment, but the confidentiality and individuality of the juvenile
proceeding is replaced by the publicity and normative concepts
of penal law."' 18 7 For these reasons and others, the status of being
a youthful offender is insufficient by itself to warrant a transfer
to circuit court. The Commonwealth would also have to establish, in a preliminary hearing, ir that the child has been either adjudicated delinquent for a felony within one year prior to the
commission of the charged offense or that the child has failed to
comply with a dispositional order following an adjudication of
delinquency for a felony offense during the year immediately
preceding the bringing of the action. 189 Some theorists, in attempting to identify the youthful offender, propose that the

gree, KRS § 508.060(2) (1975); and unlawful imprisonment in the first degree, KRS §

509.020(2) (1975).
184Ch. 640, § 115(1); ch. 635, § 106(4).
185See KRS § 208.170(1) (Cur. Supp. 1980). The minimum age limit for transfer
varies from state to state. In California, the minimum age is 16. CAL. WELF.& INST. CODE

S 707 (West Supp. 1982). In New York, the minimum age is 13. N.Y. FAM. CT. Aar § 712
(McKinney Supp. 1981).
188 Schornhorst, The Waiver of Juvenile Court Jurisdiction:Kent Revisited, 43 IND.

L.J. 583, 586 (1968). The United States Supreme Court has held that the decision to either
transfer a child to the criminal courts or retain him within the juvenile court is "critically

important" to the preservation of the child's rights and the outcome of his case. Kent v.
United States, 383 U.S. 541,553 (1966).
187 Schornhorst, supra note 186, at 586-87.
188Kent established the following specific guideines for transfer hearings in juvenile

court: (1) there must be a hearing; (2) the child has a right to counsel; (3) the attorney
must have access to all information considered by the court in reaching the decision; and
(4) the reasons for the decision must be in writing. Kent v. United States, 383 U.S. at 561-

62.

189 Ch. 640, § 115(1).
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seriousness of the crime be the sole factor. This approach fails to

recognize that not every child who has committed a serious crime
was dangerous before the crime or will ever be dangerous
again.1'° Recognizing this, the proposed Code would rely primarfly on the predictive validity of recent past behavior. Therefore,
under the proposed Code, serious criminal behavior corroborated by repetitiveness of the behavior would generally be the
basis for transfer. This standard would reject the "best interests
of the child and the community" standard mandated by the present provision, 19' and might alarm some who perceive it as increasing the probability of transfer by limiting judicial discretion.

Such fears are unwarranted. The development of specific criteria would be in keeping with the general "'procedural safeguard" approach of the entire Code. It would set forth the specific criteria on which transfer could be had, but would ultimate192
ly reserve the transfer decision to the discretion of the judge.
Therefore, judicial discretion to retain jurisdiction would not be
abridged, while judicial fiat to transfer, allegedly in the "best interest of the child and the community," would be limited. Furthermore, the proposed transfer provisions would permit the
child to show cause why he should not be transferred, a right absent-at least in statute if not in practice-from present provi-

sions. 193

Regardless of the safeguards imposed, the gravity of a decision to transfer a child to the circuit court is clear,194 and it is
190See Taylor, supra note 174, at 24. For a discussion of other criteria for transfer,
see Browne, GuidelinesforStatutesfor Tranferof Juvenilesto CriminalCourt, 4 PEPPERDINE L. REv. 479 (1977).
191KRS § 208.170(3) (Cum. Supp. 1980). Under the present provision, the best interest of the child and the community is to be determined through consideration of a num-

ber of factors including: (1) the seriousness of the offense; (2) whether the offense was
against person or property; (3) the maturity of the child; (4) the child's prior record; (5)
prospects for adequate protection of the public; and (6) services and facilities available in
the juvenile justice system and their likelihood of successfully rehabilitating the child. Id.
These factors were drawn from the appendix accompanying the Kent decision, which had

enumerated eight factors that should be considered in the decision-making process. See
Kent v. United States, 383 U.S. at 566-67.

192 Ch. 640, § 115(3).

193 Seech. 640, § 115(2).
194The transfer law constitutes a line on the other side of which lies the thres-
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therefore important to examine the child's right to appeal such a
decision. Under the present provision an appeal lies, as a matter
of right, from all orders and judgments whereby a child may suf95
fer loss of liberty, loss of property or punishment in any matter.
While the statute makes no express mention of a transfer order,
the Kentucky Court of Appeals, in Newsome v. Commonwealth,9 " held that a transfer order was implicitly contemplated
by the statute. This sound interpretation, however, may be abrogated by the wording of the proposed Code's appeal provision
which would provide that "[a]n appeal to the circuit court may
be taken as a matter of right from the juvenile session of the district court from dispositional orders under Section 29 of this
Act."' 97 The issue under the proposed Code thus would become
whether a transfer order is a disposition. It would appear that it
is not. "Dispositional," under section 29, clearly would assume
disposition pursuant to an adjudication of delinquency, not dispositions in the broad sense of informal adjustment of the case by
the court. 96 A transfer to the circuit court would not appear to be
a disposition in this sense for it would occur only upon a determination of probable cause and before an adjudication.'9 Thus, the
proposed Code would seem to prohibit the direct appeal of a
transfer to circuit court. If this is indeed the case, the transfer
proceeding would in effect become little more than "a preliminary hearing... , the abuse of which cannot be challenged until a criminal trial has taken place and the child has been deprived of all his special rights under the juvenile code."21 Such a
hold to the criminal justice system. On the juvenile court side of that line,
there is an arrangement of individualized justice therapeutically oriented
to the best interest of the child. On the other side lies a system of criminal
process and sanction predicated, for the most part, on punishment and the
best interest of society. The difference between one side and the other may
well mean the difference between five years under juvenile jurisdiction
and life imprisonment.
Stamm, Transfer of Jurisdictionin Juvenile Court: An Analysis of the Proceeding,Its Role
in the Administrationof Justice, and a Proposalforthe Reform of Kentucky Law, 62 Ky.
L.J. 122,143 (1973-74) (citations omitted).
195 KRS § 208.380(1) (Cum. Supp. 1980).
196 No. CA-1900-MR (Ky. Ct. App. May 11, 1979).
197 Ch. 610, § 31(1).
198 See ch. 610, § 29(1).
19 Seech. 635, § 106; ch. 640, § 115(1).
200 Stamm, supra note 194, at 180. Stamm was addressing the state of the law in
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procedural system certainly would fly in the face of the underlying premises of the juvenile court system in general and, in particular, the policies enunciated in Newsome.20 1 If the Code is implemented, this provision should be hastily amended to provide a
right to appeal the transfer order before any action is taken
against the child in circuit court.
A child would have no right to bail in a juvenile court; however, upon transfer to the circuit court, he would be accorded the
same right to bail as an adult. 212 If a child is unable to meet the
conditions of bail or pre-trial release, he would, regardless of
age, be permitted to be detained.m There would be limitations
upon such detention, however. No youthful offender under sixteen years of age could be detained in a police station, jail or prison, except upon a determination that his conduct endangered his
own safety or welfare or the safety or welfare of others in a detention facility for children.m Upon such a finding, the youthful
offender could be detained in those facilities, but would have to
be separated by sight and sound from adult prisoners.- The implication, of course, is that any youthful offender over sixteen
could be detained in a police station, jail or prison without the
mandate of separation by sight and sound."

Kentucky prior to Newsome, but the argument is still valid in the context of the possible
retreat from Newsome which would be sounded by the proposed Code.
201 SeeNewsomev. Commonwealth, No. CA-1900-MR, slip op. at 8-12.
202 Ch. 610, § 37(1); ch. 640, § 116. See also Op. Ky. Att'y Gen. 72-381 (1972).
M Ch. 640, § 116. Section 116 would provide: "Any person proceeded against as a
youthful offender under the provisions of this chapter shall, regardless of his age, be transferred to a facility meeting the requirements of Sections 41 through 44 of this Act... "
Id. Section 41 would call for a "detention facility for children" or detention in an adult facility separated from adult prisoners by"sight and sound," ch. 610, § 41, but no other "requirements" would be listed which the facility would have to meet. Under the "least drastic alternative" approach of the proposed Code, the facility could be either a non-secure or
secure facility, as dictated by the conduct or condition of the child. See ch. 600, § 2(23).
2"
Ch. 610, § 41.
2
W Id.
206 "As a practical matter, with the exception of approximately five counties in the
Commonwealth, the detention facility employed by the various county fiscal courts is the
jail used for adult prisoners." McAnulty & Baltzell, Juvenile Practice,ch. 4, S 4.03, in 4
BALDWIN'S KENTucx PRACtICE (1979). The proposed Code would follow the circumventing nature of the present provision and define a "secure detention facility" to include a
"physically secure setting which is entirely separated from sight and sound from all other
portions of the jail containing adult prisoners." Compare ch. 600, § 2(37) with KRS §
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A youthful offender convicted of a felony would be subject to
the same sentencing procedures and duration of sentence as an
adult similarly convicted.207 Under the present provision commitment is to the Bureau of Corrections, though it is within the
court's discretion to instead commit a child under eighteen to the
Department for Human Resources.m Under the proposed statute, any sentence of incarceration imposed would be automatically served in an institution operated by the Department, at
least until the yofithful offender reached the age of eighteen.M If
a youthful offender reached that age prior to the expiration of his
sentence, he would be returned to the sentencing court, which
210
would determine whether he should be placed on probation,
returned to the Department21 ' or incarcerated in an institution
operated by the Bureau of Corrections. Additionally, a youthful
offender committed to the Department could, upon motion of
the Department,212 be committed to the Bureau of Corrections,

208.010(11) (1977). Arguably, however, a child found not to be in need of secure detention could not be detained in an adult jail facility, even if it were the only one available.
See also Skeans v. Vanhoose, 512 S.W.2d520 (Ky. 1974).
207 Ch. 640, § 117. Restrictions on sentencing would be found in ch. 640, § 118,
which would provide in part:
(1) No youthful offender who has been convicted of a capital offense
shall be sentenced to capital punishment, but instead shall be sentenced to a
term appropriate for one who has committed a Class A felony.
(2) No youthful offender shall be subject to persistent felony offender
sentencing under the provisions of KRS 532.080 for offenses committed before the age of eighteen (18) years.
This latter provision would be a codification of Anderson v. Commonwealth, 465 S.W.2d
70, in which Kentucky's highest court stated that it is cruel and.unusual punishment to
sentence a child to life without possibility of parole.
M KRS § 208.180 (1977).
M Ch. 640, § 117(2).
210 Ch. 640, § 117(2)(a). The court could, by written order, order such supervision
to be performed by the Department for Human Resources. Ch. 640, § 119(1)(a). As originally proposed, the new Code would have also 9reated a youthful offender parole board.
See KRS § 208F.070 (Cum. Supp. 1980). In the proposed Codes final version, however,
the youthful offender-like the adult offender-would be subject to the jurisdiction of the
Kentucky parole board. See ch. 640, § 121.
211 Ch. 640, § 117(2)(b). The purpose of the return of the child to the department
would generally be to allow for the completion of a treatment program; such a program
could not last more than six months. See id.
212 Ch. 640, § 12(1). Notice of the motion and a hearing would be required. Id.
Compareid. with ch. 635, § 114(4) (would permit the transfer of a public offender from a
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apparently regardless of age, if it were established that the
youthful offender had: (1) by his violent behavior endangered
the life or health of another in the institution; (2) escaped from
the institution on more than one occasion; (3) encouraged other
residents to engage in violent behavior; or (4) smuggled contra213
band into the institution.
The transfer provision of the proposed Code would be, to
some degree, a paradox. It would seem to be a punitive, retribution-oriented facet of a system otherwise founded on the tenets of
treatment and rehabilitation.2 14 A "get-tough" approach would
be apparent in several aspects, including the lowering of the upper age limit from twenty-one to eighteen of those who could
serve their sentences committed to the Department for Human
Resources rather than the Bureau of Corrections.215 Nevertheless,
the drafters of the Code did recognize that the stakes are high for
a child involved in a transfer proceeding. The general provisions
of the Code as a whole, in addition to those of the youthful offender chapter, would set forth well-defined criteria which
would be subject to rigorous procedural safeguards meant to protect the interests of the children involved. Moreover, under the
proposed provisions, transfer would not be inherently an abandonment of the child to punitive criminal sanctions. Provisions
requiring commitment to the Department rather than the
Bureau of Corrections in most cases would assure to some extent
that only those children who could not be dealt with by the juvenile justice treatment system would be relegated to the adult
penal system. Of course, only implementation and subsequent
observation can indicate whether the processes and sanctions of
the criminal justice system would be brought to bear on a minimal number of children.

department treatment facility to the youthftl offender program-and possible incarceration-without a hearing.
213 Ch. 640, § 120(1)(a)-(d).

214 See generally Stam, supranote 194, at 145.

215 Comparech. 640, § 117(2) with KRS S 208.180(1) (1977).
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VI. THE COMMITMENT OF 16
2
MENTALLY DISORDERED CHILDREN
Accompanying the significant changes in juvenile court procedures have been efforts to make similar revisions in the mental
health laws for minors.2 17 Most recently under attack in many
states has been the parental prerogative to "voluntarily 218 admit
their children into a mental hospital or other treatment facility.219 As one commentator has stated: "[S]ince the promise of
treatment has been an empty one for many who have been civilly
committed, hospitalization has borne more of a resemblance to
incarceration than treatment for a mental disorder."' 0 Accordingly, the attack has focused on the "loss of liberty"221 which is
"involved in such 'voluntary' hospitalizations and the need for
the same type of due process safeguards accorded those subject to
the juvenile justice system."2 However, the United States Su-

216 "Mentally disordered," as used in the proposed Code, would refer to "a child

with substantially impaired capacity to use self-control, judgment or discretion in the conduct of his affairs and social relations, associated with maladaptive behavior or recognized
emotional symptoms which can be related to physiological, psychological or social factors." Ch.600, § 2(27).
217 Most legal commentary has been critical of leaving commitment decisions to
mental health professionals and parents. See, e.g., Szasz, The ChildAs InvoluntaryMental Patient: The Threatof Child Therapy to the Child's Dignity, Privacy& Self-Esteem,
14 SAN DEco L. REv. 1005 (1977); Note, The Mental Hospitalizationof Children and the
Limits of ParentalAuthority, 88 YALE L.J. 186 (1978). But see Bezanson, Toward Revision of Iowa's Juvenile Commitment Laws: Thoughts on the Limits of Effective Governmental Intervention, 63 IoWA L. REV. 561 (1978); Ellis, VolunteeringChildren:Parental
Commitment of Minorsto Mental Institutions,62 CALIF. L. REv. 840 (1974).
218 Commitment would be possible with or without a child's consent; thus, "voluntary" is clearly a misnomer. The proposed Code would use "voluntary" to describe commitments consented to by the child as well as nonconsensual commitments of children
under 14 years of agebrought about by their parents. Ch. 645, § 128(1).
219 See Secretary of Pub. Welfare v. Institutionalized Juveniles, 442 U.S. 640 (1979);
Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584 (1979).
220 Silverstein, Civil Commitment of Minors: Due and Undue Process, 58 N.C. L.
REv. 1133, 1140 (1980). Nevertheless, it is the belief of Dr. Silverstein, a lawyer and clinical psychologist, that recent changes in mental health laws designed to afford due process
safeguards to minors are misdirected. In his opinion, the effect of the legal intervention is
to make treatment more difficult and consequently less likely to succeed. Id.
221 For a comprehensive, although somewhat theoretical, discussion of the nature of
the child's liberty interest, see Garvey, Children and the Idea of Liberty: A Comment on
the Civil Commitment Cases,68 Ky. L.J. 809 (1979-80).
222 Silverstein, supranote 220, at 1137.
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preme Court recently refused to impose the full range of due process requirements on the mental health system in its dealings

with minors.2
For several reasons, then, chapter 645 of the proposed Code
is especially interesting. First, it would establish new, comprehensive provisions for the treatment of children with mental disorders, superseding the use of the commitment procedures of
chapter 202A.22 Second, it would far exceed the due process requirements found to be constitutionally mandated in commitment proceedings in the recent case of Parham v. J.R.22 The
standards established in the proposed chapter would afford chil-

223 See Secretary of Pub. Welfare v. Institutionalized Juveniles, 442 U.S. at 640; Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. at 584. Each case involved state statutes authorizing a parent to
commit a child to a mental health institution without a formal hearing. In both cases, the
Supreme Court reversed the rulings of the district courts and held that neither statute violated the due process clause of the Constitution. Secretary of Pub. Welfare v. Institutionalized Juveniles, 442 U.S. at 650; Parham, v. J.R., 442 U.S. at 620. The Court in Parham
did conclude that "the risk of error inherent in the parental decision to have a child institutionalized for mental health care is sufficiently great that some kind of inquiry should be
made by a 'neutral factfinder' to determine whether the statutory requirements for admission are satisfied." 442 U.S. at 606 (citation omitted).
2 Presently KRS chapter 202A is made applicable through KRS § 208.150 (Cum.
Supp. 1980). Section 208.150 states:
If an investigation indicates that a child before the juvenile session of
district court may be mentally ill or defective, the court may cause the child
to be examined by a health officer or child guidance clinic, or any reputable
physician who will conduct the examination. If such examination confirms
mental illness or defect, further proceedings shall be had in accordance with
the law governing inquests concerning sanity.
Id.
5 442 U.S. 584 (1979). "While the Supreme Court's decision will not necessitate
any changes in current state laws concerning civil commitment hearings, it is likely to slow
the movement toward the imposition of adversary hearings on the civil commitmeht process." Silverstein, supranote 220, at 1145 (citations omitted).
The Parhamdecision requires only the following to satisfy the child's due process
rights:
(1) Review of theparental decision by a neutral facifinder;
(2) The neutral factfinder need not be an administrative or judicial officer
and may be a staff physician, so long as he or she has the authority to refuse
to admit any child who does not satisfy the standards for admission;
(3) A "probe" of the child's background using "all available sources;"
(4) An interview with the child; and
(5) Periodic review by a similar procedure to determine the child's continuing need for commitment.
442 U.S. at 606-07.
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dren many of the same due process protections to which adults
are entitled,m and the procedures enumerated would closely
parallel those of the chapter pertaining to abused, dependent or
neglected children. 7 The proposed statute would distinguish
four groups of mentally disordered children. The distinctions
would be procedural rather than substantive, and would not be
based on the type of severity of the mental disorder.
Class I children would be those characterized as "voluntary
admissions." A child over fourteen could admit himself 9 or, if
under fourteen he could be admitted by his parents.M Upon a request for voluntary admission, a child would be admitted if an
examination by two qualified mental health professionals23' revealed the need for diagnosis, care or treatment of a mental disorder, and that such disorder could only be effectively treated by
hospitalization.232 Upon admission of the child, notice would
have to be given to the child's parents and the court-designated
worker of the county in which the facility was locatedA21
Class II admissions would be those children who were originally voluntarily admitted as Class I patients but who later requested their release.2 Upon ascertaining that a child's admisz Adults are entitled to notice and to an evidentiary hearing before commitment.
Humphrey v. Cady, 405 U.S. 504 (1972). Necessarily, this includes the right to be represented by an attorney and to testify, as well as to present and cross-examine witnesses. See
KRS S 202A.040(3) (Cum. Supp. 1980). See also Specht v. Patterson, 386 U.S. 605, 610

(1967).
227 See ch. 620.
2M Ch. 645, § 128(1). See generally Ellis, supra note 217; Note, On the Voluntary
Admission ofMinors, 8 U. MICH. J.L. RF. 189 (1974).
= Ch. 645, § 130(1). Consent of the child's parent or guardian would not be necessary. Id. Another state which allows a minor 14 years or older to commit himself is Pennsylvania. See PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 50, § 7201 (Purdon Supp. 1981).
230 If over the age of 14, the child would have to be in agreement or the matter
would be treated as an involuntary commitment. Ch. 645, § 130(2). If committed prior to
his 14th birthday, upon reaching that age the child would have to consent to continued
hospitalization or request release from the treatment facility. Ch. 645, § 129(1). Statutes
currently in force which allow a parent to commit a child under 18 years of age without
the child's consent include: IND. CoDE ANN. § 16-14-9.1-2(2) (Burns Supp. 1981); NEV.
REV. STAT. § 433A.540(2) (1979); and Omo Bav.CODE ANN. § 5122.02(B) (Page 1981).
231 Ch. 645, § 130(3)-(4). At least one of these persons would have to be a physician.
Id. "Qualified mental health professionals" would include psychiatrists, psychologists, licensed psychiatric nurses and certified social workers. Ch. 600, § 2(33)..
232 Ch. 645, § 130(3)-(4).
233 Ch. 645, § 131.
2u Ch. 645, § 128(1), 132.
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sion was no longer voluntary,2 the court-designated worker
would be required to file a complaint requesting the child's release.2 Upon the filing of the complaint, counsel would be appointed to represent the child at every stage of the proceedings.2
If the release of the child was opposed by parents or staff,2 the
child could be held for seventy-two hours pending court review. 23 9 In the hearing provided, the court would determine
whether there was probable cause to believe: "(1) [t]hat [the]
child is mentally disordered, and ... as a result ... is dangerous;140 (2) [tjhat the least restrictive alternative method of treatment requires hospitalization or residential treatment; and (3)
[t]hat the treatment desired is available [at] the treatment facility."241

W Ch. 645, § 132(2). The proposed Code would require that "a child who is voluntarily admitted for hospitalization and treatment: (1) Shall be informed of his continuing
right to request his own release, and to consult with the court designated worker." Ch.
645, § 132(1). A further provision, guaranteeing communication between the child and
the court designated worker, would state: "Any child who believes that his detention ... is involuntary... shall have the right to contact the court designated worker in
the county in which the facility in which [the child] is being held is located to communicate his needs. .. ." Ch. 645, § 133. Finally, § 134 of this chapter would provide that
"[t]he court designated worker shall, at all times, be permitted access to any child detained
or hospitalized ... and shall be permitted access, at all times, to any medical, psychological, social, billing or other records maintained by the facility relating to the child or to his
treatment." Ch. 645, § 134.
236 Ch. 645, § 132(2).
237 Ch. 645, § 137(2). Interestingly though, the role of the child's counsel at various
stages of the proceeding could change. In the pre-adjudicatory and adjudicatory proceedings the attorney would try to advance the express wishes of the child, but during dispositional proceedings the attorney would have to advance the best interest of the child. Id.
Obviously, these positions could, at times, conflict. The child's counsel would be required
to explain all relevant facts concerning inpatient treatment, and he would also have to advise the child that, if committed, the child could be released only by the staff of the hospital after notice to the court or by the court after a review. Ch. 645, § 144(2). At no point
would the attorney be required to disclose that he could at some time during the proceedings cease to be an advocate for the child's express interests.
M The staff would be able to note opposition to release on the child's medical
records and provide the parents with a written statement of the reasons for their opposition. Ch. 645, § 132(4).
239 Ch. 645, § 132(3).
240 Ch. 645, § 143(1)." 'Dangerous' means danger, threat of danger to self or others,
which results in substantial physical harm or threat of. . . harm to self or others .. .
Ch. 600, § 2(11).
241 Ch. 645, § 143(1)-(3).

KENTUCKY LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 70

The court at that time would also have to explain to the child
his right to a full adjudicatory hearing within twenty-one days, 42 2
his right to present testimony and evidence on his own behalf, his
right to a complete record of the proceedings, his right to appeal,
and his right of habeas corpus. m If the court was of the opinion
that the Commonwealth had established the conditions set forth
2
above, the case would be set for a full adjudicatory hearing. "
Whenever possible, the child would be released to the custody of
his parents; where confinement proved necessary, the child
would be held in the least restrictive environment compatible
with his condition, pending adjudication. 24 '
The rights afforded the child at the preliminary hearing
would also apply in the adjudicatory hearing. 24 6 The adjudicatory hearing itself could be conducted in an informal manner and
setting, 24 7 and would determine whether the child met the criteria for commitment as alleged by the petition. A determination
of mental disorder and dangerousness would have to be established by clear and convincing evidence. 24 The Code would require a showing
(a) [t]hat as a result of a mental disorder, the child needs and is
likely to benefit from the treatment proposed; and
(b) [tihat the proposed commitment is consistent with the
treatment of the child and that it is the least restrictive available means to achieve these treatment needs; and
(c) [tihat placement for such is immediately available ...
or... 9 can be found within a maximum of five.., working
days. 24

242 The right to a full adjudicatory hearing would generally arise within 21 days
after the child's initial confinement; in the case of Class II admissions, however, the date
from which the 21-day period would be calculated would be the date on which the confinement was contested and release requested. See ch. 645, §§ 146(1), 147(1).
243 Ch. 645, § 145.
244 Ch. 645, § T46(1).
m Ch.645, § 146(2).
246 Ch. 645, § 147(2).
247 Ch. 645, § 147(4).
248 Ch. 645, § 148(1).
249 Ch. 645, § 148(1)(a)-(c).
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Class III admissions would be the institutional transfers of
children, committed to the Department under another chapter
of the proposed Code, to a hospital or other residential treatment facility5z or the transfer of committed mentally disordered
children from one placement to another. 2 The procedures specified would require five days written notice be given to the committing court, to any counsel of record, to the child and to his
parents.se Children proceeded against under the provisions of
this section would be entitled to a hearing upon motion of any
party or upon motion of the courtA1
Class IV admissions would involve involuntary and emergency commitmentsA- Jurisdiction of the court could be initiated
by filing an original complaint alleging the mental disorder of a
child and requesting involuntary commitment, or by amending
an active complaint under any other provision of chapters 620,
625, 630, or 635 any time prior to adjudication.-- If the latter
was done, a finding of jurisdiction under this section would not
preclude other jurisdictional grounds, but would take precedence. 21 In addition to the general required specifications of the
complaint, the complaint would also have to set forth a detailed
description of any symptom or behavior bf-the child which supported the allegations.m
The court, after reviewing the complaint, could issue a warrant259 for the child to be taken into custody if there was probible
2 See ch. 645, § 135. "Hospital" would connote a state mental hospital or institution, public or private, licensed and approved to provide residential care and treatment
for mentally disordered children. Ch. 600, § 2(21).
645, § 135.
251
2 Seech.
2 Id.
253 Id.
254

Id.

Ch. 645, §§ 128(1), 136.
256 Ch. 645, § 136. The proposed Code would also provide: "No child who has been
certified to circuit court pursuant to KRS Chapter 640 shall be eligible for referral for evaluations or commitment for treatment under this chapter. Evaluations or commitment for
treatment for such youthful offenders shall be initiated by KRS Chapter 202A or KRS
Chapter 504." Ch. 645, § 128(3).
7 Ch. 645, § 128(2).
2 Ch. 645, § 137(l).
259 A child could also be detained on an emergency, warrantless basis for up to 24
hours withoutcourt authorization. Ch. 645, §§ 141-42.
255
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cause to believe that the child was mentally disordered and dangerous.m The child would then immediately be taken to a qualified mental health professional for evaluation.2 1' After the evaluation, the child would be brought before the court for a hearing
within seventy-two hours.262 An attorney would be appointed for
the child immediately upon his being taken into custody, and the
results of the evaluations and recommendations for treatment
would be made known to the court designated worker and the attorney at least twenty-four hours before the initial court review.m The initial review and subsequent adjudicatory hearing
would be conducted in the manner prevously described.M
The proposed Code would further provide that a child committed under Class II, III or IV proceedings should have a court
review thirty days after the adjudicatory hearing, followed by
further review within sixty days of the adjudicatory hearing.2
At that time, a determination would be made whether to release
the child or to recommit the child for a period of up to 180
days.26 Finally, the proposed Code would incorporate a "mental
patient's bill of rights"226 and procedures to be followed should a
child refuse to participate in his treatment plan, including judicial review of the appropriateness of the proposed treatment.M
Clearly, in implementing specific procedural safeguards and
providing frequent occasion for judicial review and intervention,
the drafters demonstrated that they were not wary, as was the
Supreme Court in Parham,72 0 of judicial involvement in juvenile

2W

Ch.645, § 139(1).

261 Ch.645, § 139(2).
262 Ch. 645, § 139(3).

2 Ch.645, § 142(2).
24 See notes 242-49 supra and the accompanying text for a discussion of the procedures which would be followed in these hearings.
M Ch. 645, § 150(1).
266 Ch.645, § 150(2).
267 Id. At the conclusion of this period the court, with the child and counsel present
for the review, could either release the child or recommit him for a period not to exceed
180 days. Ch.645, § 150(3).

M See ch. 645, § 151.

269 Ch.645, § 152.

270 In Parham, Chief Justice Burger stated:
As the scope of governmental action expands into new areas creating new
controversies for judicial review, it is incumbent on courts to design proce-
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commitment decisions. Departing from the Parham approach,
the "neutral decision-maker" in commitment proceedings would
be the court, and judicial intervention would be mandated early
in most commitment proceedings. One commentator has implied
that such scrutiny at early stages may be inherently less disruptive, from a clinical standpoint, than .legal intervention at the
later stages of treatment. 271
Despite the apparent departure from Parham, one group of
children might not benefit from the protections of the procedural
provisions. That group would be composed of children under
fourteen years of age "voluntarily" committed by their parents
without the children's consent. That such commitment would be
voluntary is certainly a legal fiction. The question presented,
though, is whether such a child could request his release and
272
avail himself of the procedures available to Class II admissions.
On the face of the appropriate section it would appear that those
procedures would be available
since the section applies to those
"voluntarily admitted."27 3 Other sections of this chapter, however, indicate that this would not be the case. Most significantly,
proposed section 129(1) provides: "Any child admitted under
subsection (4) of Section 130 of this Act who reaches his fourteenth birthday shall consent to his continued hospitalization, or
shall request his release from the hospital or residential treatment
facility.-* 74 Impliedly, then, the consent or non-consent of a child
under fourteen years of age would be irrelevant.
The constitutionality of such a provision has been upheld by
the United States Supreme Court, 75 but the rationale underlying
that decision has been soundly criticized. 76 If it proved true that
dures that protect the rights of the individual without unduly burdening the
legitimate efforts of the states to deal with difficult social problems. The judicial model for factfinding for all constitutionally protected interests, regardless of their nature, can turn rational decisionmaking into an unmanageable enterprise.
Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. at 608 n.16.
271Silverstein, supranote 220, at 1145.
272
See ch. 645, S 132.
273
See id.
274 Ch. 645, § 129(1).
275 Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584 (Georgia statute allowing parents to voluntarily
commit a child under 18 years of age upheld).
276 See, e.g., Garvey, supra note 221; Note, A Chance to be Heard. An Application
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children under fourteen were not afforded the rights and procedures prescribed in chapter 645 and could avail themselves only
of those enumerated in Parham,2 7 the conclusion would be unmistakeable that the drafters were of the opinion that if the interests of a parent and of a child under fourteen conflicted, the parent's interest should be given greater weight-at least in commitment proceedings. Although the statute and Parham both provide for a "neutral decision maker," in these cases the mental
health professional, there are numerous reasons why such a decision-maker might not adequately protect the child's interest.
First, in this type of commitment, the mental health professional
is usually initially consulted by the child's parents rather than by
the child. One commentator has suggested that the possibility of
conflict in the doctor's concern with the interests of both parent
and child may force a compromise decision, rather than a decision in the child's best interest.278 Second, the assumption that the
parent is acting in the child's best interest may be erroneous.
Mental hospitals have in the past served as dumping grounds for
children whose presence in the home was inconvenient or annoying to the family;72 9 further, it has been noted that "[e]xperts on
mental illness in juveniles repeatedly emphasiz[e] that the problems of the juvenile are often closely intertwined with mental
and emotional problems of other family members."280 Finally, it
has been suggested that screening by admitting psychiatrists or
other mental health professionals, as a check against parental excess, is more theoretical than real.28 '

ofBelotti v. Baird to the Civil Commitment of Minors, 32 HAsTiNs L.J. 1285(1981).

-77 See note 225 supra for an enumeration of the due process rights required by the

Parhamdecision.
278 Note, supranote 276, at 1308-09.

V9 See J.R. v. Parham, 41L2 F. Supp. 112, 133 (M.D. Ga. 1976), rev'd, 442 U.S. 584
(1979).
280 Institutionalized Juveniles v. Secretary of Pub. Welfare, 459 F. Supp. 30, 30
(E.D. Pa. 1978), rev'd, 442 U.S. 640 (1979).

281 See Ellis, supranote 217, at 864. As Ellis has observed:
Experience shows that in the most blatant cases of parental error psychiatrists do screen out admissions which are not warranted by apparent pathology in the child. In less obvious cases, however, psychiatrists may fail to
perform an effective screening function. There are three reasons for this failure: (1) The performance of psychiatrists in precommitment interviews and
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If children under fourteen could not, upon request for release, avail themselves of the Class II procedures, they would also
be expressly denied the right to the periodic judicial review of the
appropriateness of their commitment. That their unconsented-to
commitment would be labelled voluntary would not make it so;
therefore, the rationale which would deny review to voluntary
commitments should not be applied to this class of children. If
the results discussed in the foregoing paragraphs were not intended by the drafters of chapter 645, the proposed Code should
be hastily amended to eliminate the ambiguity.
CONCLUSION

The revision of the Kentucky Unified Juvenile Code undertaken by the S.R. 55 Task Force was a long and arduous task. As
a result, the proposed Code adequately addresses the concerns
which initially provided the impetus for a unified code. Yet those
looking to the proposed Code to impose more stringent, punitive
measures on the serious juvenile offender may view the Code
with mixed emotions. The proposed Code would provide a
strong procedural framework for intervention, both formal and
informal, while at the same time generally safeguarding the due
process and liberty interests of those who would come in contact
with the juvenile justice system.
Nevertheless, the concerns raised by this article should be
considered by the legislature prior to the implementation of the
Code. The delay of implementation of the unified code enacted
before the S.R. 55 Task Force revisions, rather than its repeal, indicated a strong philosophical commitment to such a Code in the
most recent General Assembly. What remains to be seen, however, is whether the philosophical commitment will be supported
by fiscal commitment.

examinations is often perfunctory and tends toward overdiagnosis; (2) Psychiatrists maybe insensitive to legally important commitment issues; (3) The
effectiveness of the psychiatrist in the admitting process is weakened by uncertainty over whose agent he or she is in such circumstances-the parent's
or the child's.

